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Abstract
Volatility risk premia compensate agents for holding assets whose payoffs correlate with
times of high return variation. This paper takes a structural approach to explain the cross-
section of volatility risk premia of stocks using a Lucas orchard with heterogeneous beliefs,
stochastic macro-economic uncertainty, and default risk. I study two manifestations of
uncertainty, namely (i) agents’ disagreement and (ii) time-varying volatility of fundamental
growth rates. The paper shows that while the former source of risk accounts for the level
of the risk premia, the latter mainly affects the higher order moments of the risk premium
distribution. Together with uncertainty, default risk associated with levered trees implies
a non-monotonic equilibrium link between stock returns and volatility which allows for
positive or negative risk premia. Calibrating the economy, I show that the model accounts
for predictability of excess stock returns and corporate credit spreads. I construct volatility
risk premia from option and stock prices and document that in the time-series, volatility
risk premia of individual stocks can be positive or negative, and switch sign rather often.
In the cross-section, they are only weakly related to traditional risk factors. I then test
the model predictions and find that empirical proxies for investors’ uncertainty about
expected growth rates and macro-economic uncertainty are priced risk factors that convey
information over and above those contained in other standard factors to explain these risk
premia. In line with the model predictions, I present predictability evidence of individual
volatility risk premia for stock excess returns and corporate credit spreads.
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Volatility risk premia compensate investors for holding assets whose payoﬀs are correlated with times
of high return variation. While most of the recent literature has focused on the index volatility risk
premium, this paper studies individual volatility risk premia in the cross-section of stocks both
theoretically and empirically. I develop an economy with multiple assets where each ﬁrm is subject
to default. The proﬁtability of each ﬁrm is unknown and has to be learned. I allow two rational
manifestations of uncertainty, (i) agents’ disagreement about the future proﬁtability of ﬁrms and
a business-cycle indicator, and (ii) time-varying volatility of fundamental growth rates to have a
bearing on risk premia in equilibrium.My results show that the interplay between leverage and the
two sources of uncertainty add a crucial component to the understanding of both the time-series
and cross-section of individual volatility risk premia.
Empirically, volatility risk premia of ﬁrms with low leverage display a diﬀerent behavior than
those of ﬁrms with high leverage. Figure 1 documents this fact. The upper left panel plots the
average volatility risk premium, proxied by the diﬀerence between the model-free implied volatility
calculated from option prices and the realized volatility calculated from stock returns, for the 5th
leverage percentile of all ﬁrms in the S&P 500 index. The lower left panel depicts the average
volatility risk premium for the 95th leverage percentile. There are several observations. First, both
volatility risk premia display a counter-cyclical behavior and the volatility risk premium of the high
leverage ﬁrms tends to be more counter-cyclical than the one of the low leverage ﬁrms. This is
indicated by the larger increase of the risk premium in periods of ﬁnancial or economic crisis. For
instance, the average change in the volatility risk premium of high leverage ﬁrms in crisis periods is
30%, opposed to a 11% increase for low leverage ﬁrms. Second, the average volatility risk premium
of low leverage ﬁrms turns negative more often than high leverage ﬁrms.1 This is conﬁrmed in
the right panel of Figure 1 where I depict the boxplot of volatility risk premia for low and high
leverage ﬁrms: Low leverage ﬁrms display a more negatively skewed distribution than high leverage
ﬁrms. The skewness is -1.32 which is more than 50% more negative than for the high leverage
ﬁrms. Moreover, the median volatility risk premium of the low and high leverage ﬁrms is 0.0049
and 0.0192, respectively. Running a simple t-test reveals that I can reject the null hypothesis of
zero diﬀerence between the two means.
1In the time-series, I ﬁnd that in 18% of all observations the volatility risk premium turns negative, while for high
leverage ﬁrms the volatility risk premium is negative 10% of the time.
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[Insert Figure 1 approximately here.]
The counter-cyclical nature of the market volatility risk premium has prompted a number of re-
searchers to examine the impact of economic uncertainty on the volatility risk premium. Drechsler
and Yaron (2008), Drechsler (2008), and Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009) study time-varying
economic uncertainty under the assumption of recursive preferences in a consumption-based model.
In such an economy, absent an explicit link between the innovations in consumption and volatil-
ity, one must endow agents with a preference for early resolution of uncertainty and a stochastic
volatility of consumption growth volatility, in order to replicate the distinct empirical features of the
volatility risk premium and its higher order moments. In such a framework, however, the volatility
risk premium can only be positive, as agents require a higher premium for holding the risk. While
the volatility risk premium for the market is indeed positive most of the time, it does switch signs
over time and interestingly, these periods of negative risk premia tend to coincide with times of
economic or ﬁnancial crises.
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On the individual stock level, as outlined before, I ﬁnd that volatility
risk premia tend to be negative more often.3
Surprisingly little research has been undertaken to understand the economic drivers of volatility risk
premia of individual stocks. This paper seeks to ﬁll this gap and studies the cross-section of volatility
risk premia from an asset pricing perspective. In a partial information economy with multiple
assets and agents, I propose a structural explanation for the diﬀerential behavior of volatility risk
premia in the cross-section of stocks, based on the role of stochastic macro-economic uncertainty
and heterogeneity in beliefs. I study a Lucas’ orchard economy, in which rational investors update
their beliefs according to Bayes’ Law and where claims to trees are subject to default risk. The
growth rate of the ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow streams and a business cycle indicator are unknown to all
agents in the economy. In order to implement optimal portfolio choices, these growth rates have
to be estimated and investors disagree on them. In addition, I assume that these expected growth
rates carry a volatility which follows a two-state Markov switching process. The intuition borrows
2In the period from January 1996 to September 2008, the volatility risk premium of the S&P 500 was negative
ﬁve times. Note that the points of a strongly negative market volatility risk premium usually occur during times of
economic or ﬁnancial crises. For instance, one striking drop in the index volatility risk premium was in spring 2000,
right after the NASDAQ bubble burst. Similarly, since the start of the economic crisis in 2007, the market volatility
risk premium has turned negative three times.
3This ﬁnding is inline with Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003) and Carr and Wu (2009) who document a
large dispersion in variance risk premia of individual stocks and more importantly, a more positively skewed return
distribution.
2
from the long-run risk literature, which emphasizes the importance of a time-varying conditional
volatility of consumption growth. In equilibrium, when belief heterogeneity and macro-economic
uncertainty vary over time, they drive a substantial fraction of the volatility of asset returns. The
interaction between leverage, belief heterogeneity, and uncertainty allows for both positive and
negative volatility risk premia. For low leverage ﬁrms with high uncertainty, the volatility risk
premium can be negative, whereas for high leverage ﬁrms, the risk premium tends to be positive.
I study these model implications theoretically within a calibrated model and link them directly to
the diﬀerential empirical pricing patterns of individual options.
My approach departs from the existing literature in two important aspects. First, I study the cross-
section of individual volatility risk premia in a multi tree economy, which poses a more challenging
quest than understanding the index volatility risk premium itself due to the large dispersion of the
volatility risk premia in the cross-section of stocks. Second, I distinguish between two manifestations
of uncertainty: (i) The uncertainty induced by fundamental values (the stochastic volatility of
the expected growth rate of cash ﬂows and a business cycle indicator) and (ii) its heterogeneous
perception by the agents. While both carry the label uncertainty, I allow for two distinct channels
through which uncertainty is reﬂected in risk premia. The former enters into the stochastic discount
factor by aﬀecting the moments of the distribution of the disagreement. The higher the macro-
economic uncertainty, the higher the ﬁrst and second moments of the disagreement. In addition,
I show that for explaining the cross-sectional pattern of volatility risk premia, both speciﬁcations
contribute distinct parts. While the subjective uncertainty quantitatively ﬁts well the level, the
macro-economic uncertainty accounts for higher order moments of the volatility risk premia such
as volatility, skewness, and kurtosis.
The more speciﬁc features of the model are as follows: The growth volatility of fundamentals and
agents’ disagreement are time-varying and are allowed to aﬀect the volatility risk premia via the
stochastic discount factor. A higher disagreement on future cash ﬂows induces a higher volatility and
negative skewness for medium to high leveraged ﬁrms. For ﬁrms with low leverage, it is possible that
the risk-neutral skewness turns positive. The economic reason is due to the diﬀerent sensitivities of
the default option embedded in stock returns: For low leverage companies, this option is far out-
of-the-money and its value is more sensitive to changes in skewness. For high leverage companies,
the default option is closer to be in-the-money and the opposite holds. In my economy, agents have
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time-separable utility and the diﬀusions of the fundamental process and the consumption growth
volatility are assumed independent. In an economy without disagreement, under these assumptions,
the diﬀerence between the risk-neutral and physical expected volatility would be equal to zero.
If disagreement is a priced risk factor, the wedge is entirely driven by agents’ uncertainty and
the time-varying macro-economic risk. Calibrating the model, I conﬁrm several of the empirical
ﬁndings. Both disagreement and realized conditional consumption growth volatility matter in their
implications for volatility risk premia, and I ﬁnd the ﬁrst source to dominate. Shutting down the
stochastic volatility of cash ﬂow growth, the level of volatility risk premia is mainly explained by the
diﬀerence in beliefs. However, higher order moments, such as the persistence, skewness, and kurtosis
of the risk premia are driven, to a large extent, by economic uncertainty. A simulation exercise
shows that the model is able to replicate the predictability of stock excess returns and corporate
credit spreads. Moreover, the estimated coeﬃcients correspond in sign and size to their empirical
counterparts. This paper is a ﬁrst step towards a uniﬁed study of agents’ (disagreement) and macro-
economic uncertainty, and I hope to give credence to the hypothesis that both subjective agents’
uncertainty and realized objective uncertainty could matter for volatility risk premia of stocks.
To empirically test the model predictions, I construct model-free measures of volatility risk premia
(see Carr and Madan, 1998 and Britten-Jones and Neuberger, 2000) and risk-neutral skewness
(Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan, 2003) from stock option prices using data from January 1996 to
September 2008. Following Hamilton (1989), I estimate a Markov chain process for the second
moment of consumption growth to get a measure of the conditional volatility of fundamentals. In
addition, I build a forward-looking measure of disagreement about future cash ﬂows of ﬁrms based
on forecasts of corporate earnings. The separation of the two uncertainty channels has an empirical
appeal. By its forward-looking construction, disagreement captures perceptions of risk looming on
investors’ horizon. Thus, it conveys information over and above the one contained in the conditional
volatility of consumption which is estimated using historical data.
I document two results which are, to the best of my knowledge, new to the literature. First, simple
panel regressions reveal that both disagreement and the conditional volatility of consumption matter
for volatility risk premia and outperform the explanatory content of other factors known to aﬀect
these risk premia. For instance, a one standard deviation change in ﬁrm-speciﬁc disagreement in-
creases the volatility risk premium by 0.5%, which corresponds to one third of the average volatility
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risk premium in the cross-section of stocks. A slightly smaller change is induced by the conditional
volatility of consumption growth. Disagreement and time-varying consumption growth volatility
account for 12% of the variation of volatility risk premia in the cross-section. The empirical assess-
ment also reveals that the impact of uncertainty on the volatility risk premia can be positive or
negative depending on the leverage level. For low leverage ﬁrms, the impact is negative, whereas for
medium to high leverage ﬁrms the estimated coeﬃcients are positive. The stability and strength of
these results is particularly noteworthy given the sample period I consider: Using data from 1996
to 2008, I capture interesting periods during which volatility risk premia reverse signs and as such
turn out to be more diﬃcult to explain. I also ﬁnd that the volatility risk premia of cyclical stocks
are more exposed to uncertainty than non-cyclical stocks. For instance, the estimated coeﬃcient
for uncertainty on cyclical stocks is twice as large as for non-cyclical ones.
Second, I present evidence that the volatility risk premium contains forecasting power for both the
cross-section of stock excess returns and corporate credit spreads. Similar to previous results in
the literature for the index volatility risk premium, I ﬁnd that predictability of the stock excess
returns is strongest in the short run: The predictive power of the individual volatility risk premia
is strongest at a horizon of eight months and then steadily declines. An analogue pattern is found
for corporate credit spreads.
Understanding the diﬀerential pricing of options and their embedded volatility risk premia in the
cross-section is important, as the joint behavior of derivative and equity markets may help to improve
our general understanding of the dynamics of asset prices. This has become particularly apparent
in the past few months: While almost all asset classes have experienced major drawdowns, trading
volume of VIX futures has increased ﬁvefold during the crisis relative to its volume at inception in
2006.4
A traditional way to lock-in the implicit volatility risk premium is by forming delta-hedged short
straddle or strangle portfolios. These strategies are becoming increasingly popular, especially in
4Short volatility option strategies not only represent an attractive diversiﬁcation strategy in bear markets due to
the high negative correlation between the market index and any plain vanilla option strategy, but empirical studies
also show these strategies perform exceptionally well in crisis periods. For example, after the tech bubble burst in
2000, the S&P 500 declined by 45% over the years September 2000 to September 2002. At the same time, a short
variance swap strategy on the same index went up by more than 40% with a lower standard deviation (see e.g. Grant,
Gregory, and Lui, 2007).
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the aftermath of the 2008 credit crisis as volatility increased to exceptionally high levels.5 In Figure
2, I plot the annualized returns and Sharpe ratios for ﬁve common option trading strategies and
three benchmark indices in the period January 1996 to September 2007.6 Naked call overwriting
and the short index put strategy outperform the equity indices in terms of risk-return relationship:
The average Sharpe ratio of the indices is around 0.4 while the call overwriting (short put) yields a
Sharpe ratio of 0.55 (0.7). The most successful strategy is the short variance swap strategy on the
index, which yields an average Sharpe ratio of 1.64.
Now, imagine a na¨ıve investor who writes at-the-money, 1% out-of-the money, and 5% out-of-the-
money straddles on all options on stocks in the S&P 500, independent of their cheapness. During
this period, the investor would have earned an annualized return of 8.4% with a Sharpe ratio of
0.5. If one were conﬁdent about the existence of a large volatility risk premium, then an alternative
strategy can be developed by forming a long-short factor mimicking portfolio. In this portfolio,
the agent is long the (cheapest) stocks which have the largest negative volatility risk premium and
short the stocks with the largest positive (most expensive) volatility risk premium. With respect
to the previous strategy, a potential advantage of this portfolio is that, since it is long-short, it
can be constructed not to be exposed to average changes in volatility but only to cross-sectional
diﬀerences in the risk premium. Applying this method, I ﬁnd that this zero cost trading strategy
yields a return of 21% and a Sharpe ratio of 1.66. I also ﬁnd that for a CRRA investor, independent
of the level of risk aversion, the certainty equivalent of the sophisticated strategy is always higher
than the one of the na¨ıve short straddle strategy.
[Insert Figure 2 approximately here.]
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I. introduces a general equilibrium
model with multiple trees and agents, which is solved for prices and risk premia, and investigates
quantitatively the implications of the model for the cross-section of volatility risk premia. Section
5Other papers that study trading strategies which use the volatility risk premium as a trading signal are Goyal
and Saretto (2009) (plain vanilla option strategies) and DeMiguel, Plyakha, Uppal, and Vilkov (2009) (hedge fund
strategies).
6I acknowledge that Sharpe ratios can be highly misleading when analyzing trading strategies with highly non-
normal returns. As a robustness check, I calculated the adjusted Sharpe Ratio due to Bao (2009) and ﬁnd the
sophisticated straddle portfolio to dominate the strategies.
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II. describes the data. Section III. tests the model predictions. Finally, Section IV. concludes the
paper.
Literature Review:
The paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, I give an economic rationale for
the non-monotonic relationship between leverage and the implied volatility skew of options: The
default option in stocks coupled with the uncertainty renders the implied volatility smile positive
or negative depending on the level of leverage. Second, I study two diﬀerent sources of uncertainty:
Agents’ disagreement and macro-economic uncertainty as proxied by the stochastic growth rate
volatility of cash ﬂows. While both sources of risk have been shown to play an important role in
explaining volatility risk premia in the literature, this is the ﬁrst paper to unify both approaches.
Third, the solution technique for the multi-asset economy is diﬀerent from the literature. The
conditional density of the state variables is recovered through Fourier inversion of the conditional
characteristic function, which is in closed-form. This diﬀers from an approach of replacing the
moment-generating function with an integral of exponential functions or a modeling via the share
process. Lastly, my paper contributes to the literature studying heterogeneous beliefs and asset
prices. In my economy, the a posteriori uncertainty remains stochastic due to the Markov-switching
volatilities in the expected growth rates, unlike in models with deterministic decay. While the
literature has focused mainly on a Markovian structure for the expected growth rate of dividends
itself, this is the ﬁrst paper to study a switching growth rate volatility.
The notion that leverage should impact on the implied volatility of options goes back to Geske
(1979) and Toft and Prucyk (1997). The idea is that as the value of the ﬁrm’s assets declines,
the ﬁrm becomes more levered and the volatility of equity increases. Their models feature ﬁrm’s
assets with a constant variance processes, but explicitly account for the impact of risky debt on the
dynamics of the ﬁrm’s equity. By incorporating the option-like characteristics of levered equity, this
branch of literature introduces a natural negative relationship between stock prices and volatility.
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More recently, Geske and Zhou (2008) study the impact of leverage on the pricing of individual
options. They ﬁnd that leverage signiﬁcantly impacts on the return distribution. Moreover, leverage
reduces pricing errors by 60% with respect to other option pricing models without leverage. Engle
7The relationship between leverage and stock returns has prompted a plethora of literature using dynamic capital
structure models. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. See Gomes and Schmid (2008) for an excellent summary
and extension of the literature.
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and Mistry (2008) and Hong, Wang, and Yu (2008) ﬁnd that ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms have
more positively skewed daily returns and that more importantly, lower leverage implies a more
positively skewed return distribution.
Equilibrium models with multiple trees have been studied in the literature before. Menzly, Santos,
and Veronesi (2004) and Santos and Veronesi (2009) study a multi-asset economy with external habit
and derive closed-form solutions for prices in equilibrium. Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) study a two
country two good economy with demand shocks and log-linear preferences. Cochrane, Longstaﬀ,
and Santa-Clara (2008) study a Lucas (1978) economy with two trees and its implications for stock
returns, correlations, and the equity risk premium. Both papers provide closed-form solutions for
the case of i.i.d. trees and log utility. A diﬀerent approach is taken by Martin (2009) and Chen and
Joslin (2009), who replace the moment generating function with an integral of exponential functions
and show that under certain forward measures (Esscher transforms), closed-form solutions can be
obtained. Martin (2009) then extends the analysis of Cochrane, Longstaﬀ, and Santa-Clara (2008)
to multiple trees, Poisson jumps in the dividend process, and general power utility. He shows that his
model is able to replicate many salient features of asset returns, such as momentum, mean-reversion,
contagion, ﬁght-to-quality, the value-growth eﬀect, and excess volatility. Chen and Joslin (2009)
generalize the method in Martin (2009) and allow for a general class of non-linear transforms of
aﬃne jump-diﬀusions. They apply their method to a series of applications like credit risk, multiple
trees, and heterogeneous beliefs economies. My paper diﬀers from the previous ones in several
aspects. First, none of these papers studies the impact of uncertainty or disagreement in a multi-
tree economy on volatility risk premia. Second, the solution technique taken here is diﬀerent from
the previous ones. Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) and Cochrane, Longstaﬀ, and Santa-Clara (2008)
can derive solutions for the case of i.i.d. dividends and log utility as the density function for other
cases is not known. The solution technique proceeds in two steps: I ﬁrst solve for the posterior
density of the state variables and then can derive the Fourier transform. The conditional density
of the state variables is then recovered through Fourier inversion of the conditional characteristic
function which can be found in closed-form. In particular, I show that the parameters driving
the state variables can be summarized as a system of matrix Riccati equations, which in turn can
be linearized and solved very conveniently. This circumvents the curse of dimensionality problem
usually encountered in the literature, see e.g. Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009). Martin (2009)
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and Chen and Joslin (2009) solve very elegantly for asset prices by replacing the moment generating
function with an integral of exponential functions for which closed-form solutions are known. In
particular, this method allows the authors to solve for a high dimensional state space.
The literature aiming at giving a structural explanation for the emergence of volatility risk premia is
sparse. Motivated by the empirical results in Bollen and Whaley (2004), who show that changes in
implied volatility are related to signed option volume, Gaˆrleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009)
study the link between the level of end user option demand and the level and overall shape of
implied volatility curves. They document that end users tend to have a net long index option
position and a short equity-option position, thus helping to explain the relative expensiveness of
index options.8 They also show a strong downward skew in the net demand of index but not equity
options, which helps to explain the diﬀerence in the shapes of their overall implied volatility curves.
Their framework is eﬀective in explaining the steeper slope of index options due to the excess
demand for out-of-the-money puts, but less so in diﬀerentiating the pricing of individual options in
the cross-section.
Previous papers have studied the impact of uncertainty on the market volatility risk premium,
mostly in settings with recursive preferences. Bansal and Shaliastovich (2008) introduce learning
into a long-run risk model, in which asset prices require a premium for jump risk. Shaliastovich
(2008) sets up a similar economy, where the unobservable expected growth of consumption has to
be learned from a cross-section of signals. The quality of these signals generates an uncertainty
which is modeled to contain large positive shocks. Fluctuating conﬁdence risk aﬀects the equi-
librium asset prices and since out-of-the-money puts hedge jump risk in conﬁdence, they appear
expensive relative to models with no jump risk. Further, endogenous negative jumps in equilib-
rium prices due to the positive jumps in uncertainty generate a negatively skewed and heavy-tailed
unconditional distribution of returns. Eraker (2008) studies an equilibrium with long-run risk and
a highly persistent volatility process. Drechsler and Yaron (2008) add infrequent but potentially
large spikes in the level of volatility together with infrequent jumps in the small, persistent compo-
nent of consumption and dividend growth. While volatility shocks from a standard long-run risk
model have a suﬃciently large market price of risk to generate a variance risk premium, second and
8These ﬁndings are also complemented by the recent work of Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshman (2007)
who document that for both individual equity calls and puts end users are more short than long.
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third moments of the variance risk premium together with the short-horizon predictability of stock
returns is generated in a setting with non-Gaussian shocks. Zhou (2009) links the time-variation of
the market volatility risk premium to the stochastic volatility of volatility of consumption growth
in a model with recursive preferences. The literature studying the volatility risk premium with
recursive preferences typically interprets the wedge between the risk-neutral expected and physical
volatility as a proxy for the aggregate risk aversion (see e.g. Bollerslev, Gibson, and Zhou, 2009) or
economic uncertainty (see e.g. Drechsler, 2008, Drechsler and Yaron, 2008, and Bollerslev, Tauchen,
and Zhou, 2009). It is challenging to extend this reasoning to a multi asset framework in such a
setting. First, in these model, stochastic risk aversion or economic uncertainty is a latent process
whereas my model allows me to empirically pin down uncertainty. Second, it is diﬃcult to align a
negative risk premium with aggregate risk aversion or economic uncertainty as in this case it lacks
an intuition.
Finally, previous papers have studied learning in an endowment economy where expected growth
rates are Markovian. David (2008) constructs a general equilibrium economy with two groups of
investors who have heterogeneous beliefs about the state of the economy. Imperfect risk-sharing
implies that less risk averse agents trade more aggressively and demand a higher risk premium. A
calibrated model ﬁts the equity premium and replicates the distinct features of the time-variation in
consumption growth moments. Chen and Pakosˇ (2008) and Pakosˇ (2008) model an economy with
a representative agent who has recursive preferences. The expected growth rate of consumption
follows a two-state Markov chain and using observations on aggregate consumption, dividend, and
a signal, the investor builds beliefs about the growth rates being in one state or another. The
authors then show that persistency of the consumption growth rate, together with a preference for
early resolution generates an uncertainty premium which is large enough to account for various
features of asset prices. My paper departs from these papers along several dimensions. First, in
my economy, agents do not build beliefs about the probability of switching itself but investors learn
about the expected growth rate. Second, none of the papers distinguishes between a subjective
(agent-driven) uncertainty and objective (macro-economic) uncertainty. Third, these papers do not
study the cross-section of volatility risk premia.
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I. The Economy with Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Heterogeneous Beliefs
A. The Model
I extend the standard single-asset Lucas-tree pure-exchange framework to the case with multiple
assets and two investors. The economy has inﬁnite horizon [0,∞) and uncertainty is represented
by a ﬁltered probability space (Ω,ℱ , {ℱ푡}, 푃 ) on which is deﬁned a standard Brownian motion:
푊 =
(
푊퐴1 ,푊퐴2,푊푧,푊휇퐴1 ,푊휇퐴2 ,푊휇푧 ,푊휎휇퐴1
,푊휎휇퐴2
,푊휎휇푧
)
′
. All stochastic processes are assumed
adapted to {ℱ푡; 푡 ∈ [0,∞)}, the augmented ﬁltration generated by the Brownian motion 푊 . There
are two ﬁrms in the economy, which produce their perishable good. Cash ﬂows of ﬁrm 푖 = 1, 2 have
the following dynamics:
푑 log퐴푖(푡) = 휇퐴푖(푡)푑푡+ 휎퐴푖푑푊퐴푖(푡),
where 휎퐴푖 ∈ ℝ
+ is the cash ﬂow volatility of ﬁrm 푖. Cash ﬂows are observable, but their expected
growth rate 휇퐴푖(푡) is not and has to be estimated given the available information. The dynamics
of 휇퐴푖(푡) is given by:
푑휇퐴푖(푡) = (푎0퐴푖 + 푎1퐴푖휇퐴푖(푡)) 푑푡+ 휎휇퐴푖푑푊휇퐴푖 (푡),
where 푎0퐴푖 ∈ ℝ is the growth rate of expected cash ﬂow growth, 푎1퐴푖 < 0 is the mean-reversion
parameter. Parameter 휎휇퐴푖 (푡) ∈ ℝ
+ measures the uncertainty about the individual growth rate of
ﬁrm 푖 cash ﬂows. The dynamics of 휎휇퐴푖 follow a hidden Markov chain with two states 휎휇퐴푖 > 휎휇퐴푖
,
with a transition matrix for the time interval (푡, 푡+ 푑푡) given by:
ℙ(푑푡) =
⎡⎣ 1− 휆푑푡 휆푑푡
휇푑푡 1− 휇푑푡
⎤⎦ . (1)
The Brownians 푊퐴푖 and 푊휇퐴푖 are assumed to be independent. This explicitly rules out any corre-
lation between the return and the volatility due to statistical correlation.
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In order to estimate the dividend growth rates, investors make also use of information produced
by a market-wide indicator 푧(푡) of the aggregate growth rate in the economy. The market-wide
indicator 푧(푡) has the following dynamics:
푑푧(푡) = (훼퐴1휇퐴1(푡) + 훼퐴2휇퐴2(푡) + 훽휇푧(푡)) 푑푡+ 휎푧푑푊푧(푡),
푑휇푧(푡) = (푎0푧 + 푎1푧휇푧(푡)) 푑푡+ 휎휇푧(푡)푑푊휇푧(푡),
where 휎푧 ∈ ℝ
+ is a signal precision parameter and it’s dynamics follow the same Markov chain as
for the cash ﬂows with transition probabilities given in equation (1). The market-wide signal 푧(푡) is
an unbiased estimator of 훼퐴1휇퐴1(푡) + 훼퐴2휇퐴2(푡) + 훽휇푧(푡) and is therefore linked to the growth rate
of both ﬁrms in the economy. For 훽 = 0, it produces unbiased estimates of a linear combination of
ﬁrms’ growth rates. If additionally 훼퐴1 = 훼퐴2 , it is an unbiased indicator of the actual aggregate
growth rate in the economy. When 훽 ∕= 0, signal 푧(푡) is biased by another unobservable variable
휇푧(푡), which is completely independent of cash ﬂows. Hence, the relative importance of parameters
훼퐴1 , 훼퐴2, and 훽 determines to which extent the information provided by 푧(푡) is contaminated by an
orthogonal market-wide component not directly related to expected dividend growth. Parameter
휎휇푧 ∈ ℝ
+
measures the market-wide uncertainty about 휇푧(푡) itself, and it further controls the
degree of uncertainty with which 푧(푡) can be interpreted as an aggregate indicator of economic
growth. If 훽 ∕= 0 and 휎휇푧 is large, shocks to 푧(푡) are interpreted as an evidence of a change in
expected cash ﬂows and the highly volatile orthogonal market-wide component 휇푧(푡). Therefore,
on average, a change in 푧(푡) will tend to generate large revisions of agents’ estimates of the market-
wide component 휇푧(푡) and a larger degree of disagreement across investors. If 휎휇푧 = 0, any change
in the expected growth rate of 푧(푡) derives from a change in dividend growth rates and 휇푧(푡) can
be treated by investors as deterministic. Finally, 푎0푧 is the long-term growth rate of the expected
change in 휇푧(푡) and 푎1푧 < 0 its mean-reversion parameter.
B. Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Disagreement
I consider a simple speciﬁcation for the uncertainty and disagreement in my economy. Investors
update their beliefs based on the available information using Bayes’ Law. Diﬀerences in their
posteriors can arise from a diﬀerence in agents’ priors, in conjunction with a diﬀerence in some
12
subjective parameter of the dynamics of cash ﬂows and the market-wide indicator or a stochastic
volatility of the cash ﬂow growth. The former approach entails some irrationality of agents as it
implicitly assumes that while the volatility of fundamentals is fully observable and agents agree on it,
agents disagree on the growth rate volatility. In the latter situation agents have the same perception
about the growth rate volatility, nonetheless, the disagreement does not converge asymptotically to
zero. I follow this assumption when I derive the testable predictions of my model. The assumption
of independent Brownian motions 푊퐴푖 and 푊휇퐴푖 and the independence of the Markov chain with
the fundamentals makes the learning dynamics tractable.
Let 푚푛(푡) :=
(
푚푛퐴1(푡), 푚
푛
퐴2
(푡), 푚푛푧 (푡)
)
′
:= 퐸푛
(
(휇퐴1(푡), 휇퐴2(푡), 휇푧(푡))
′
∣ℱ푌푡
)
where ℱ푌푡 := ℱ
퐴1,퐴2,푧
푡
is the information generated by cash ﬂows and the market-wide signal up to time 푡, and 퐸푛(⋅)
denotes expectation with respect to the subjective probability of investor 푛 = 퐴,퐵. 훾푛(푡) :=
퐸푛
(
(휇(푡)−푚푛(푡)) (휇(푡)−푚푛(푡))′ ∣ℱ푌푡
)
is the posterior variance-covariance matrix of agent 푛.
Let the state vector be 푌 (푡) = (log퐴1(푡), log퐴2(푡), 푧(푡)), 푏(푡) = diag(휎휇퐴1 (푡), 휎휇퐴2 (푡), 휎휇푧(푡)) and the
following parameters be ﬁxed: 푎0 = (푎0퐴1 , 푎0퐴2 , 푎0푧)
′
, 푎1 = diag (푎1퐴1 , 푎1퐴2 , 푎1푧), 퐵 = diag(휎퐴1 , 휎퐴2 , 휎푧),
and
퐴 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0
0 1 0
훼퐴1 훼퐴2 훽
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
Empirical evidence for a two-state Markov switching process for the consumption growth volatility
goes back to Kandel and Stambaugh (1990) who ﬁnd that consumption growth volatility varies with
the business cycle. In particular, consumption volatility tends to be larger at the end of recessions.
More recent papers that study Markov-switching models for consumption growth volatility include
Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008) and Boguth and Kuehn (2009). In these models both
the mean and volatility of consumption growth are allowed to switch and agents do not know the
true state of the economy and have to infer it from consumption data. David (2008) studies an
endowment economy, where the expected growth rate of dividends switches according to a two-state
Markov switching process and agents learn about the drifts using observable fundamentals. Two
groups of investors agree to disagree on the evolution of the states. The approach taken in this
paper departs from the previous papers along several dimensions. First, in my economy, agents
know the state of the growth volatility and do not have to learn it. As a consequence, the nature
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of uncertainty is diﬀerent. Agents do not observe expected growth rate which contain a switching
volatility. The source of uncertainty comes through the learning of the expected growth rates and
not through the uncertainty about the states themselves. Second, the parameter 푏(푡) is observable
and agents’ ﬁltering problem is standard. This is diﬀerent from the set-up in David (2008), Pakosˇ
(2008) and Chen and Pakosˇ (2008) where the Markov-switching structure renders the learning
problem non-linear.
Given the observability of the parameter 푏(푡), the model implied state dynamics is conditionally
Gaussian at the steady-state of the posterior mean. Therefore, in this case, the Bayesian updating
rule of each agent can be derived by standard ﬁltering methods and the heterogeneity in beliefs is
fully summarized by the diﬀerences in posterior means 푚푖(푡) and variance-covariance matrices 훾(푡)
across agents. The posterior beliefs of agent 퐴 are as follows:
푑푚퐴(푡) = (푎0 + 푎1푚
퐴
(푡))푑푡 + 훾퐴(푡)퐴′퐵−1푑푊퐴푌 (푡), (2)
푑훾퐴(푡)/푑푡 = 푎1훾
퐴
(푡) + 훾퐴(푡)푎′1 + 푏(푡)푏(푡)
′
(푡)퐴′(퐵퐵′)−1퐴훾퐴(푡), (3)
with initial conditions 푚퐴(0) = 푚퐴0 and 훾
퐴(0) = 훾퐴0 , where 푑푊
퐴
푌 (푡) := 퐵
−1
((
푑푌 (푡)− 퐴푚퐴(푡)
)
푑푡
)
is the innovation process induced by investor 퐴’s belief and ﬁltration.9 훾(푡) is the posterior variance-
covariance matrix of the the posterior expected growth rates 푚퐴(푡). The time-varying parameter
푏(푡) impacts on the distribution of 푚퐴(푡) indirectly, by inﬂuencing the Riccati diﬀerential equation
for 훾퐴(푡). In particular, under the assumption that 푏(푡) is observable, the Riccati equation can be
solved in closed form at the steady state.
Finally, to complete the speciﬁcation of the disagreement structure in my economy, I deﬁne the
disagreement dynamics implied by the learning dynamics of agent 퐵. This process is the key state
variable driving all equilibrium quantities. In my economy, it is deﬁned by the following three
dimensional process:
Ψ(푡) :=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
Ψ퐴1(푡)
Ψ퐴2(푡)
Ψ푧(푡)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
(
푚퐴퐴1(푡)−푚
퐵
퐴1
(푡)
)
/휎퐴1(
푚퐴퐴2(푡)−푚
퐵
퐴2
(푡)
)
/휎퐴2(
푚퐴푧 (푡)−푚
퐵
푧 (푡)
)
/휎푧
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
9A formal proof of this result can be found in Liptser and Shiryaev (2000).
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The ﬁrst two components of Ψ(푡) measure the disagreement about the expected growth rates of
future cash ﬂows. The third component captures the disagreement about the market-wide indicator
푧(푡). Since the market-wide uncertainty parameter 휎휇푧 inﬂuences the subjective dynamics of each
individual belief, it also has implications for the stochastic properties of the disagreement process
itself. The dynamics for Ψ(푡) follows after a standard application of Itoˆ’s Lemma:
푑Ψ(푡) = 퐵−1
(
푎1퐵 + 훾
퐵
(푡)퐴′퐵−1
)
Ψ(푡)푑푡 +퐵−1(훾퐴(푡)− 훾퐵(푡))퐴′퐵−1푑푊퐴푌 (푡), (4)
with initial conditions Ψ(0) = Ψ0 and 훾
퐵(0) = 훾퐵0 . The average level and the heterogeneity of the
subjective uncertainty parameters across agents are linked to the steady state distribution of the
joint disagreement dynamics (4). This feature implies a natural link between the latent market-wide
uncertainty and the stochastic properties of the heterogeneity in beliefs, like for instance, the level
of the conditional dependence between the dividend disagreement processes Ψ퐴1(푡) and Ψ퐴2(푡). A
suﬃcient degree of dependence between Ψ퐴1(푡) and Ψ퐴2(푡) can naturally motivate a large degree of
commonality in beliefs as the one found in my data.
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C. Investors’ Preferences and Equilibrium
There are two investors in the economy with diﬀerent subjective beliefs, but identical in all other
aspects, such as preferences, endowments, and risk aversion. They maximize the life-time expected
power utility subject to the relevant budget constraint:
푉 푛 = sup
푐푛퐴1
,푐푛퐴2
퐸푛
(∫
∞
0
푒−훿푡
(
푐푛퐴1(푡)
1−훾
1− 훾
+
푐푛퐴2(푡)
1−훾
1− 훾
)
푑푡
∣∣∣ ℱ푌0 ) , (5)
where 푐푛퐴푖(푡) is the consumption of agent 푛 of good 푖, 훾 > 0 is the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient,
and 훿 ≥ 0 is the time preference parameter. I assume time-separable utility functions. This not
only simpliﬁes the computation of the equilibrium, but also interpretations, since I can sum over
individual beliefs without making any further assumptions on aggregation. Agents can trade in the
risk-free bond, the ﬁrms’ stocks, and additionally on options written on the stocks. I denote by
푟(푡) the risk-free rate of the zero-coupon bond, assumed in zero net supply, by 푆푖(푡) the stock price
10Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin (2009) study in more detail co-movement patterns of the belief processes.
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of ﬁrm 푖, assumed in positive net supply, by 푂푖(푡) the price of a European option on the stock 푖,
assumed in zero net supply, and by 퐵푑푖 (푡) the price of the defaultable bond, also assumed in zero
net supply. 푉푖(푡) denotes the ﬁrm value of ﬁrm 푖 in my economy.
Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium consists of a unique stochastic discount factor such that
(I) given equilibrium prices, all agents in the economy solve the optimization problem (5), subject
to their budget constraint. (II) Good and ﬁnancial markets clear.
The equilibrium is solved using the martingale approach, originally developed by Cox and Huang
(1989). The extension to the case with heterogenous beliefs is due, among others, to Cuoco and
He (1994), Karatzas and Shreve (1998), and Basak and Cuoco (1998). In this extension, the utility
function of the representative agent is a weighted average of the utility functions of the individual
agents. Diﬀerent than in a standard setting, however, the relative weight 휆(푡) is stochastic and
a function of the heterogeneity in beliefs across agents. Thus, diﬀerences in beliefs aﬀect real
allocation of resources and equilibrium prices. Let 휉푛(푡) be the stochastic discount factor of agent
푛, the price of any contingent claim in equilibrium can be computed from the expectation of the
contingent claim payoﬀs weighted by 휉푛(푡). In my economy, from the market clearing assumption
and the optimality conditions (5), closed form expressions for 휉퐴(푡) and 휉퐵(푡) in terms of exogenous
variables follow with standard methods:
휉퐴(푡) =
푒−훿푡
푦퐴
퐴1(푡)
−훾
(
1 + 휆(푡)1/훾
)훾
, 휉퐵(푡) =
푒−훿푡
푦퐵
퐴1(푡)
−훾
(
1 + 휆(푡)1/훾
)훾
휆(푡)−1, (6)
where 푦퐴 and 푦퐵 are the Lagrange multipliers in the (static) budget constraint of agent 퐴 and 퐵,
respectively. The stochastic discount factor of each agent is equal to the product of two terms, the
ﬁrst is the standard homogeneous economy term which is proportional to the equilibrium marginal
utility of consumption, the second is a function of weighting process 휆(푡). The dynamics of the
weighting process 휆(푡) := 푦퐴휉
퐴(푡)/
(
푦퐵휉
퐵(푡)
)
is:
푑휆(푡)
휆(푡)
= −
(
2∑
푖=1
Ψ퐴푖(푡)푑푊
퐴
퐴푖
(푡) +
(
2∑
푖=1
훼퐴푖Ψ퐴푖(푡)
휎퐴푖
휎푧
+ 훽Ψ푧(푡)
)
푑푊퐴푧 (푡)
)
. (7)
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Due to the separability assumption on agents’ utility function individual state prices 휉푛(푡) can be
expressed as functions only of 퐴1(푡) and 휆(푡) (or equivalently 퐴2(푡) and 휆(푡)). The equilibrium
relative price of good 1 and good 2 is 푝(푡) = (퐴2(푡)/퐴1(푡))
−훾
.
The dynamics of the weighting factor 휆(푡) depends on perceived shocks to cash ﬂows (푊퐴퐴1(푡) and
푊퐴퐴2(푡), respectively) and the market-wide indicator (푊
퐴
푧 (푡)). The market-wide shocks impact
on 휆(푡) proportionally to the disagreement about cash ﬂows and the market-wide signal (Ψ퐴1(푡),
Ψ퐴2(푡), Ψ푧(푡)), the relative precision of market-wide and ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks (휎퐴푖/휎푧, 푖 = 1, 2), and
the informativeness of the market-wide signal for estimating dividend growth (coeﬃcients 훼퐴1 and
훼퐴2). The state price volatility is stochastic and increasing in both Ψ퐴푖(푡), 푖 = 1, 2, and Ψ푧(푡).
The diﬀerence in the agent-speciﬁc 휉푛(푡) reﬂects the diﬀerent consumption plans of the two agents
in the economy which are necessary to induce market clearing ex-ante. Assume, for illustration
purposes, that investor 퐴 is optimistic about future cash ﬂows of both ﬁrms. Then, in equilibrium,
investor 퐵 will select a relatively higher consumption in states of low cash ﬂows of either ﬁrm 1 or
2. Therefore, the relative consumption share in this economy is stochastic and its cyclical behavior
is reﬂected by the the stochastic weight 휆(푡).
To ﬁnance her consumption plan, the pessimistic investor needs to buy ﬁnancial protection, e.g.,
put options, from the more optimistic agent. This excess demand increases the price of securities
with negative exposure to cash ﬂow shocks. In this way, part of the risk embedded in bad cash
ﬂow states is transferred from the pessimist to the optimist. Ex post, if a negative state occurs,
the more optimistic agent is hit twice: First, because the aggregate endowment is lower, second,
as a consequence of the protection agreement which makes her consumption share lower in those
states. Ex ante, the more optimistic agent is compensated by a premium for having entered the
insurance contract with the pessimist. This premium is increasing in the degree of disagreement
among agents about the probability of future bad cash ﬂow states.
D. Pricing of Financial Assets
Given the expressions for the individual state price densities 휉퐴(푡) and 휉퐵(푡), it is straightforward
to price any contingent claim in the economy by computing expectations of its contingent payoﬀs
weighted by state price densities. For simplicity, I give the relevant pricing expressions from the
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perspective of agent 퐴. The equilibrium ﬁrm value and the price of a default-free zero coupon with
maturity 푇 of ﬁrm 푖 are given by:
푉푖(푡) = 퐴푖(푡)퐸
퐴
푡
(∫
∞
푡
푒−휌(푢−푡)
휉퐴(푢)
휉퐴(푡)
퐴푖(푢)
퐴푖(푡)
푑푢
)
, 퐵푖(푡, 푇 ) = 퐸
퐴
푡
(
휉퐴(푇 )
휉퐴(푡)
)
.
As in the Merton (1974) model, default occurs only at maturity of the corporate bonds, if the value
of the assets of the ﬁrm is less than the face value of the bond. I assume zero-bankruptcy costs.
Therefore, in the event of default, equity holders are left with a zero price of equity and the corporate
bond holders share the residual ﬁrm value. To focus on the implications of disagreement and macro-
economic uncertainty, I keep the default structure as simple as possible and do not explore more
general default rules or more ﬂexible default and liquidation procedures. In this setting, it follows
that the price of the defaultable bond is the sum of the prices of the zero-coupon bond and the
price of a short put option on the ﬁrm value and the equity is the ﬁrm value residual in excess of
the price of the corporate debt or a call option on the ﬁrm value:
퐵퐷푖 (푡, 푇 ) = 퐾퐵푖퐵푖(푡, 푇 )− 퐸
퐴
푡
(
휉퐴(푇 )
휉퐴(푡)
(퐾퐵푖 − 푉푖(푇 ))
+
)
, 푆푖(푡) = 퐸
퐴
푡
(
휉퐴(푇 )
휉퐴(푡)
(푉푖(푇 )−퐾퐵푖)
+
)
,
(8)
where 퐾퐵푖 is the face value of the bond of ﬁrm 푖. To compute the expectations in the pricing
expressions, I need the joint density of 퐴1(푡), 퐴2(푡), 휆(푡), and the contingent claim payoﬀ, since
the stochastic discount factor, 휉퐴(푡), is a function of both 퐴1(푡), 퐴2(푡) and 휆(푡). Unfortunately, the
joint distribution of 퐴1(푡), 퐴2(푡) and 휆(푡) is typically unavailable in closed-form.
In general, there exist several methods to compute the moments of the posterior distributions. The
ﬁrst one includes either Monte Carlo simulations or numerical solutions of the partial diﬀerential
equation which arises from the expectations via the Feynman-Kacˇ methodology. However, this
method not only lacks accuracy but is also highly time-consuming, especially when dealing with
multi-asset economies where the state space is high dimensional. Another one is to recover the
conditional density of the state variables through Fourier inversion of the conditional characteristic
function, which is often available in closed-form. Then one can evaluate the moments directly using
this density. This is the approach taken by Heston (1993), Bates (1996), Bakshi, Cao, and Chen
(1997), and Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009). More recently, Chen and Joslin (2009) propose
to take the Fourier transform of the moment function and to replace the moment function with an
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integral of exponential functions, for which the expectations can be computed analytically through
the Duﬃe, Pan, and Singleton (2000) approach.11
While the second method can run into curse of dimensionality due to multiple numerical integrals
(see e.g. Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal, 2009), I can calculate the joint Laplace transform in closed-
form with only one single integral left. In order to obtain closed-form expressions, I reduce the
system of ordinary diﬀerential equations for functions 퐴Ψ, 퐵Ψ and 퐶Ψ in Lemma 1 to a system
of matrix Riccati equations, which can be linearized using Radon’s Lemma and explicitly solved.
This Laplace transform can be used, in a second step, to price all securities in my economy by
Fourier Transform methods more eﬃciently. In this way, I can avoid a pricing approach that
relies exclusively on simulation methods, which would be highly computationally intensive if not
infeasible.12 Note, however, that I compute the joint Laplace transform of 퐴1(푡), 퐴2(푡), and 휆(푡) at
the steady state distribution for the relevant state variables in my model.
Lemma 1. Under the steady state distribution, the joint Laplace transform of 퐴1(푡), 퐴2(푡) and 휆(푡) with
respect to the belief of agent 퐴 is given by:
퐸퐴푡
((
퐴1(푇 )
퐴1(푡)
)휖퐴1 (퐴2(푇 )
퐴2(푡)
)휖퐴2 (휆(푇 )
휆(푡)
)휒)
= 퐹푚퐴
(
푚퐴, 푡, 푇 ; 휖퐴1 , 휖퐴2
)
× 퐹Ψ (Ψ, 푡, 푇 ; 휖퐴1 , 휖퐴2 , 휒) , (9)
where
퐹푚퐴(푚
퐴, 푡, 푇 ; 휖퐴1 , 휖퐴2) = exp
(
퐴푚퐴(휏) +퐵푚퐴(휏)푚
퐴
)
, (10)
with 휏 = 푇 − 푡 and
퐹Ψ (Ψ, 푡, 휖퐴1 , 휖퐴2 , 휒, 푢) = exp
(
퐴Ψ(휏) +퐵Ψ(휏)Ψ + Ψ
′퐶Ψ(휏)Ψ
)
.
for functions 퐴푚퐴 , 퐵푚퐴 , 퐴Ψ, 퐵Ψ and 퐶Ψ detailed in the proof in the Appendix.
The Laplace transform in Lemma 1 is a function of 푚퐴(푡) and Ψ(푡). The dependence on 푚퐴(푡)
is exponentially aﬃne. The dependence on Ψ(푡) is exponentially quadratic. By computing the
11For example, Martin (2009) takes the Fourier transform of a nonlinear pricing kernel where the characteristic
function of the Fourier transform is known in closed form.
12The approach taken by Chen and Joslin (2009) is, however, the way to proceed for future research, especially for
estimation proposes.
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closed–form characteristic function of 퐴1(푡), 퐴2(푡), and 휆(푡) I can now price the contingent claims
in the economy more by Fourier inversion methods. The spirit of this approach is similar to the
one used to price derivatives in stochastic volatility models, such as Heston (1993), Duﬃe, Pan,
and Singleton (2000), and Carr, Geman, Madan, and Yor (2001), or in interest-rate models, such
as Chacko and Das (2002). The pricing expressions implied by the Fourier Transform approach for
all contingent claims in my economy can now be summarized. Let
퐺(푡, 푇, 푥퐴1 , 푥퐴2 ; Ψ) ≡
∫
∞
0
(
1 + 휆(푇 )1/훾
1 + 휆(푡)1/훾
)훾 [
1
2휋
∫ +∞
−∞
(
휆(푇 )
휆(푡)
)
−푖휒
퐹Ψ (Ψ, 푡, 푇 ; 푥, 푖휒) 푑휒
]
푑휆(푇 )
휆(푇 )
.
The equilibrium ﬁrm value of ﬁrm 1 is:
푉1(푡) := 푉1 (퐴1, 푚퐴,Ψ) = 퐴1(푡)
∫
∞
푡
푒−휌(푢−푡)퐹푚퐴 (푚퐴, 푡, 푢; 1− 훾, 0)퐺 (푡, 푢, 1− 훾; Ψ) 푑푢.
Similarly, the equilibrium ﬁrm value of ﬁrm 2 is:
푉2(푡) := 푉2
(
퐴1, 퐴2, 푚
퐴,Ψ
)
,
= 퐴2(푡)
∫
∞
푡
푒−훿(푢−푡)퐹푚퐴
(
푚퐴, 푡, 푢;−2훾, 1 + 훾
)
퐺 (푡, 푢,−2훾, 1 + 훾; Ψ) 푑푢.
The equilibrium price of the corporate zero-coupon bond is:
퐵푖(푡, 푇 ) := 퐵푖(푡, 푇 ;푚
퐴,Ψ) = 푒−휌(푇−푡)퐹푚퐴
(
푚퐴, 푡, 푇 ;−훾
)
퐺 (푡, 푇,−훾; Ψ) .
The equilibrium price of the defaultable bond of ﬁrm 푖 is:
퐵퐷푖 (푡, 푇 ) := 퐵
퐷
(
푡, 푇 ;퐴푖, 푚
퐴,Ψ
)
= 퐵(푡, 푇 )− 퐸퐴푡
(
푒−휌(푇−푡)
(
퐴푖(푡)
퐴푖(푇 )
1 + 휆(푇 )1/훾
1 + 휆(푡)1/훾
)훾
(퐾퐵푖 − 푉푖(푇 ))
+
)
.
The equilibrium price of equity of ﬁrm 푖 is:
푆푖(푡) := 푆푖
(
푡, 푇 ;퐴푖, 푚
퐴,Ψ
)
,
= 퐸퐴푡
(
푒−훿(푇−푡)
(
퐴푖(푡)
퐴푖(푇 )
1 + 휆(푇 )1/훾
1 + 휆(푡)1/훾
)훾
(푉푖(푇 )−퐾퐵푖)
+
)
,
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From the above formulas, I obtain a semi-explicit description for the dependence of the prices of
corporate bonds and equity on economic uncertainty and the degree of disagreement about cash
ﬂows and the market-wide signal. In the standard Merton (1974) model, the ﬁrm value volatility
is constant and the risk–neutral skewness is zero. It follows that the price of equity is increasing
in the ﬁrm value volatility parameter and co-moves positively with the value of the ﬁrm. In my
economy with uncertainty and leverage, the volatility and risk-neutral skewness of the ﬁrm value
are stochastic. For ﬁrms with diﬀerent degrees of leverage, I ﬁnd that the price of equity can either
increase or decrease with disagreement. This is also documented in Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin
(2008). To give an intuition why these features can arise, I shortly sketch the main intuition. Note
that the price of equity can be represented as a portfolio consisting of a long position in the ﬁrm
value 푉푖(푡), a short position in 퐾1 risk–less zero bonds with price 푍퐶퐵(푡), and a long position in
an out-of-the-money put on the ﬁrm value, with strike 퐾1 and price 푃 (푡):
푆푖(푡) = 푉푖(푡)−퐾1 ⋅ 푍퐶퐵(푡) + 푃푖(푡,퐾1) .
The ﬁrst term, 푉푖, is independent of leverage and is decreasing in disagreement. The price of the zero
coupon bond can be shown to be decreasing in disagreement for a relative risk aversion parameter
greater than one. Thus, the eﬀects of the ﬁrst two components of the price of equity tend to oﬀset
each other, with the second component increasing proportionally to ﬁrm leverage. The last term –
i.e. the price of the put option 푃 (푡,퐾1) – has a positive impact on the price of equity, but the size
of the eﬀect depends signiﬁcantly and in a non monotonic way on ﬁrm’s leverage. For some regions
of leverage, I ﬁnd that this eﬀect can be large enough to reverse the negative impact of the change
in the value of the ﬁrm:
푑푆
푑Ψ
+/−
=
푑푉
푑Ψ
−
−퐾1 ⋅
푑푍퐶퐵
푑Ψ
−
+
[ Delta: +︷ ︸︸ ︷푑푃
푑푉
−
⋅
푑푉
푑Ψ
−
+
Vega: +︷ ︸︸ ︷
푑푃
푑휎푉
+
⋅
푑휎푉
푑Ψ
+
+
Skewness: +︷ ︸︸ ︷
푑푃
푑푆푘푉
−
⋅
푑푆푘푉
푑Ψ
−
]
. (11)
When leverage is high, the dominating eﬀect on the price of equity comes from the ﬁrst two terms
in (11), as the Delta, Vega, and Skewness eﬀects on the put price are all small in relative terms.
For very low leverage values, the values of the put option and the position in the zero bond are a
small fraction of ﬁrm value. Therefore, the price of equity is dominated by the ﬁrst term in (11).
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It follows that for high and very low leverage the value of equity is decreasing with disagreement
at the calibrated model parameters. For the intermediate leverage region, however, the price of the
embedded out-of-the-money put option can be a non–negligible fraction of the ﬁrm value, and its
sensitivity to increases in negative skewness (the last term in square brackets) is high. In particular,
I ﬁnd that the last eﬀect can be high enough to compensate the negative change of the ﬁrm value
and make the price of equity increase. Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin (2008) present calibrated
evidence of these eﬀects in an economy with one ﬁrm. Similar to the ﬁndings for the ﬁrm value,
the endogenous stochastic co–movement between the price and the volatility of equity generates an
asymmetric physical stock price density. However, in contrast to the unambiguously negative sign
of the skewness of ﬁrm value, the skewness of stock returns can be both positive and negative in my
model: The positive (negative) co–movement between the price and the volatility of equity tends
to generate stock returns that are positively (negatively) skewed.
E. Volatility Risk Premia in the Cross-Section
In the models of Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009) and Drechsler and Yaron (2008) a high
variance in returns occurs when uncertainty is high. Thus, any asset that pays oﬀ a lot in those
states with high realized variance of returns is a hedge for the uncertainty risk, which explains why
the variance premium is positive in their economy. In my economy, as a function of leverage, there
exists assets that do not pay oﬀ a lot in bad states of the world. As we have seen in the previous
section, this applies for low leverage ﬁrms. The volatility risk premium in my economy can be
expressed as follows:
푉 표푙푅푃 (푡, 푡+ 1) = Cov푡
(
휉퐴(푡 + 1)
휉퐴(푡)
, 푅푉푖 (푡, 푡+ 1)
)
≶ 0.
To calculate the conditional covariance between the stochastic discount factor and the realized
volatility, note that the diﬀusion of the stochastic discount factor can be written as follows:
푑휉퐴
휉퐴(푡)
− 퐸푡
(
푑휉퐴(푡)
휉퐴(푡)
)
= − (훾휎퐴1 + (1− 푠푖(푡)) Ψ퐴1(푡)) 푑푊
퐴
퐴1(푡)
− (1− 푠푖(푡))
(
훼퐴1Ψ퐴1(푡)
휎퐴1
휎푧
+ 훼퐴2Ψ퐴2(푡)
휎퐴2
휎푧
+ 훽Ψ푧
)
푑푊퐴푧 (푡).
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The realized volatility is given in Appendix A. It is obvious that an analytic closed-form expression is
infeasible. However, it is straightforward, to borrow from the intuition of the risk-neutral skewness.
Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003) relate the risk-neutral skewness of the return distribution to the
steepness of the implied volatility smile and in particular ﬁnd that the more negative the risk-neutral
skewness, the steeper the implied volatility smile. The optimal risk sharing between optimistic and
pessimistic agents in my economy implies a lower price for contingent claims with positive exposure
to future cash ﬂows. This price is proportional to a stochastically weighted marginal utility of
optimistic and pessimistic agents in the economy, with a weight that is a function of agents’ relative
consumption share. Since agents have decreasing marginal utility and the equilibrium consumption
share of the pessimist (optimist) is larger in low (high) dividend states, the price of all states tends
to be lower in the economy with heterogeneity in beliefs. However, note that the equilibrium state
price adjustment associated with low dividend states tends to be larger than the one associated with
high dividend states, which yields an endogenous negative risk-neutral skewness of stock returns
for high levered ﬁrms. In case of a high disagreement or high cash ﬂow growth volatility and low
leverage, the opposite can occur which renders an endogenous positive risk-neutral skewness. In my
model, this asymmetry in the equilibrium risk-neutral distribution follows from the fact that the
agents’ marginal utility in the economy tends to be larger in low dividend states. It then follows
that in order to reallocate a given amount of consumption across agents in bad dividend states,
a larger state price adjustment is needed. Due to the assumption that agents have power utility,
the marginal utility is convex, and hence these features also imply that the state price of a bad
aggregate dividend state is proportionally lower that the average state price of a bad dividend of
either one of the two ﬁrms in the economy.
[Insert Figure 3 approximately here.]
Figure 3 plots the volatility risk premia for diﬀerent levels of leverage at diﬀerent option moneyness
and levels of macro-economic uncertainty. The three diﬀerent leverage bins correspond to the lower
tercile (leverage below 0.05), median tercile (leverage at 0.10), and high tercile (leverage above 0.14).
The disagreement is set to 0.5 in the high disagreement state (i.e. Ψ퐴1 = Ψ퐴2 = Ψ푧 = 0.5) and 0.1
in the low disagreement state (i.e. Ψ퐴1 = Ψ퐴2 = Ψ푧 = 0.1). The cash ﬂow growth volatility is set to
0.0029 in the low uncertainty case and 0.0041 in the high uncertainty case, which corresponds to a
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two standard deviations change from the unconditional mean of the consumption growth volatility.
In the left panel, I plot the volatility risk premium for a high leverage ﬁrm. The ﬁgure displays the
usual left skewness of stocks. Increasing the disagreement from 0.1 (gray line) to 0.5 (black line)
increases the volatility risk premium of the individual ﬁrm by almost 0.5% which corresponds to a
50% increase of the at-the-money volatility risk premium. Interestingly, an increase in the volatility
of the cash ﬂow growth rate not only implies a shift in the level of the volatility risk premium
but also in the steepness of the smile. For instance, increasing the cash ﬂow growth volatility from
0.0029 (gray line) to 0.0041 (red line), induces an ascent in the slope coeﬃcient especially in the out-
of-the-money put region. For intermediate leverage, the repercussions of a rise in both disagreement
and uncertainty are larger than for the high leverage ﬁrm. Increasing the disagreement implies a
0.5% boost in the volatility risk premia across the whole moneyness spectrum. I note, however, that
the slope is slightly smaller than for the high leverage ﬁrm. Finally, in the right panel, I plot the
volatility risk premia for a low leverage ﬁrm. As expected from the previous results, the volatility
risk premium turns negative at-the-money for almost all speciﬁcations except the low disagreement
and low uncertainty case.
F. Simulated Regressions
Since the volatility risk premium rises or decreases with uncertainty and this is directly linked
to the stochastic discount factor, volatility risk premia predict stock returns or corporate credit
spreads. Firstly, I show that both subjective and macro-economic uncertainty aﬀect signiﬁcantly
the volatility risk premia in the cross-section of stocks. To this end, I run panel regressions from
the volatility risk premia of the individual ﬁrms onto the ﬁrm-speciﬁc, common disagreement and
the consumption growth volatility. The results are presented in Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 approximately here.]
All three measures of uncertainty positively impact on the volatility risk premia. In terms of adjusted
푅2, the uncertainty proxies explain almost 20% of the variation in the volatility risk premia. In
the second and third column, I present regression results for low and high leverage ﬁrms. The low
leverage ﬁrms are derived by ﬁxing the leverage to 0.05 and the high leverage ﬁrms are ﬁxed to
24
have a debt to equity ratio of 0.2. While the estimated coeﬃcient for all three uncertainty proxies
is indeed negative while for the high leverage ﬁrms, the impact was consistently positive across all
leverage bins.
The volatility risk premium in my economy predicts stock returns and corporate credit spreads.
The predictive regression is:
푟푖(푡 + 1) = 훽0 + 훽1 ×
(
푣표푙ℚ푡 (푟푖(푡+ 1))− 푣표푙
ℙ
푡 (푟푖(푡 + 1))
)
+ 휖(푡),
where
훽1 =
Cov
(
푟푖(푡 + 1) + 휖(푡), 푣표푙
ℚ
푡 (푟푖(푡+ 1))− 푣표푙
ℙ
푡 (푟푖(푡+ 1))
)
Var
(
푣표푙ℚ푡 (푟푖(푡+ 1))− 푣표푙
ℙ
푡 (푟푖(푡+ 1))
) .
And a similar expression arises from the regression of the corporate credit spread. From the previous
section, we know that the expected stock return is positively related to the volatility increase: For
high leverage ﬁrms, the expected stock return and volatility increases with a rise in uncertainty. For
low leverage ﬁrms, both the expected stock returns and volatility decrease. To test this conjecture,
I present in Table 5 the predictability regressions for a horizon of 1, 6, and 12 months.
[Insert Table 5 approximately here.]
The volatility risk premium loads positively on the expected stock returns and corporate credit
spreads at all horizons. For the stock returns, the size of the coeﬃcient decreases by more than 50%
while for the corporate credit spreads the size increases by almost 50%. In line with the empirical
ﬁndings , the adjusted 푅2 for the stock return regression display the decreasing pattern at longer
horizons. For the corporate credit spreads, the adjusted 푅2 increases which is contrary to what I
found in the data.
II. Data
I ﬁrstly present some new empirical evidence that underscores the importance of including agents’
disagreement and macroeconomic uncertainty when studying volatility risk premia. I then study
the predictive power of the volatility risk premium for expected stock excess returns and corporate
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credit spreads. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc, common disagreement, and volatility of consumption growth
explain signiﬁcant portions of the volatility risk premium in the cross-section. The three measures
together explain 12% of the time variation in the volatility risk premia. Similarly, all uncertainty
measures explain on average around 8% of the time variation in the risk-neutral skewness. Volatility
risk premia predict stock excess returns and corporate credit spreads in the cross-section. The
predictive power is concentrated at shorter horizons (8 months) and then drops considerably for
stock returns and remains fairly stable for corporate credit spreads.
I merge a panel of option, stock and bond prices and ﬁrm-speciﬁc information with analysts’ fore-
casts of future earnings. The time period covers January 1996 to September 2008. Appendix B
summarizes the data construction in detail.
A. Option Data
I use option information from the OptionMetrics Ivy DB database, which is the most comprehensive
database available. Individual stock options are American style and usually expire on the Saturday
following the third Friday of the contract month. Therefore, time to maturity is deﬁned as the
number of calendar days between the last trading date and expiration date. I apply a number of
data ﬁlters to circumvent the problem of large outliers. First, I eliminate prices that violate arbitrage
bounds, i.e. call prices are required not to fall outside the interval
(
푆푒−푟푑 −퐾푒−휏푟, 푆푒−휏푑
)
, where
푆 is the value of the underlying asset, 퐾 is the strike price, 푑 is the dividend yield, 푟 is the risk-free
rate, and 휏 is the time to maturity. Second, I eliminate all observations for which (i) the ask is
lower than the bid price, (ii) the bid is equal to zero, or (iii) the spread is lower than the minimum
tick size (equal to USD 0.05 for options trading below USD 3 and USD 0.10 in any other cases).
Importantly, to mitigate the impact of stale quotes I eliminate all observations for which both the
bid and the ask are equal to the one on the previous day. I focus on short-term options which are
known to be the most liquid with a time to maturity between 14 and 31 days.
The volatility risk premium is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the risk-neutral and physical expec-
tation of the return variation. Thus, the one-month volatility risk premium, 푣푝(푡, 푡 + 1) is deﬁned
as 퐸ℚ푡
(∫ 푡+1
푡
푑푟푖
)
− 퐸ℙ푡
(∫ 푡+1
푡
푑푟푖
)
where ℚ denotes the risk-neutral measure and 푟푖 is the return
of ﬁrm 푖. In this paper, I specify a model-free implied volatility using a continuum of European
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call options.13 Let 퐶(푡, 푇,퐾) denote the price of a European call option maturing at 푇 with strike
price 퐾 at time 푡, and 퐵(푡, 푇 ) is the price of a time 푡 zero-coupon bond with maturity 푇 . Carr
and Madan (1998) and Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000) show that the risk-neutral expectation
of the return variance between time 푡 and 푡 + 1 can be expressed in a model-free fashion by the
following expression:
퐼푉 (푡, 푡+ 1) ≡ 퐸ℚ푡 (푉 푎푟(푡, 푡+ 1)) = 2
∫
∞
0
퐶 (푡, 푡 + 1, 퐾)−max (푆(푡)−퐾, 0)
퐾2
푑퐾,
which takes advantage of a continuum of calls with strikes from zero to inﬁnity. In practice, the
implied variance must be constructed from a ﬁnite number of strikes, which turns out to be a
fairly accurate approximation to the true risk-neutral expectation of the future variance under
reasonable assumptions (see Jiang and Tian, 2005). To construct a realized variance under the
physical measure, I approximate the realized variance for month 푡 as:
푅푉 (푡, 푡 + 1) ≡
푛∑
푗=1
푟푖(푗)
2,
where 푟푖(푗) is the stock return of ﬁrm 푖 at time 푗. To measure the a model-free skewness, I use
a model-free and ex-ante measure of risk-neutral skewness given by Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan
(2003). For each stock on date 푡, the skewness of the risk-neutral density of the stock return over the
period [푡, 푡 + 1] can be inferred from the contemporaneous prices of out-of-the-money call options
and put options as follows:
푆푘푒푤(푡, 휏) =
푒푟휏푊 (푡, 휏)− 3휇(푡, 휏)푒푟휏푉 (푡, 휏) + 2휇(푡, 휏)3
(푒푟휏푉 (푡, 휏)− 휇(푡, 휏)2)3/2
,
where
휇(푡, 휏) = 푒푟휏 − 1−
푒푟휏
2
푉 (푡, 휏)−
푒푟휏
6
푊 (푡, 휏)−
푒푟휏
24
푋(푡, 휏),
13There are several reasons to use the model-free implied volatility opposed to one which comes from a option
pricing model, say, the Black and Scholes (1973) model. First, the approximation seems to be fairly accurate of
the true (unobservable) risk-neutral expectation of the future return volatility than an inversion of the Black and
Scholes formula for at-the-money options, see e.g. Jiang and Tian (2005). Second, Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou
(2009) report much higher 푅2 when regressing excess market returns on the volatility risk premium constructed from
model-free measures rather than the Black and Scholes implied volatility.
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and 푉 (푡, 휏),푊 (푡, 휏), and 푋(푡, 휏) are the weighted sums of out-of-the-money call option prices
퐶(푡, 휏,퐾) and put option prices 푃 (푡, 휏,퐾) and expressions given in the Appendix A.4. The compu-
tation of the intrinsic value of higher-moment payoﬀs requires options with constant maturity and
I thus ﬁx it to 28 days. Details on the Riemann integral approximation with other related imple-
mentation issues are addressed in Jiang and Tian (2005) and Bakshi and Madan (2006). Moreover,
implementation with a ﬁnite grid of out-of-the-money calls and puts is reasonable accurate with
small approximation errors (see Dennis and Mayhew, 2002).
B. Stock Returns Data
Stock data is retrieved from the CRSP database. To calculate the realized volatility, I use daily
stock returns from CRSP. I calculate the realized volatility over 21-day windows, requiring that the
stock has at least 15 non-zero return observations.
C. Bond Data
The bond data is obtained from the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) on corporate bond
characteristics and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) database on bond
transactions. The FISD database contains issue and issuer-speciﬁc information for all U.S. corporate
bonds. The NAIC data set contains all transactions on these bonds by life insurance, property and
casualty insurance, and health maintenance companies, as distributed by Warga (2000). This
database is an alternative to the no longer available database used by Duﬀee (1998), Elton, Gruber,
Agrawal, and Mann (2001), and Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001). U.S. regulations
stipulate that insurance companies must report all changes in their ﬁxed income portfolios, including
prices at which ﬁxed income instruments were bought and sold. Insurance companies are major
investors in the ﬁxed income market and, according to Campbell and Taksler (2003), they hold about
one-third of outstanding corporate bonds. These data represent actual transaction data and not
trader quotes or matrix prices. Initially, I eliminate all bonds with embedded optionalities, such as
callable, putable, exchangeable, convertible securities, bonds with sinking fund provisions, non-ﬁxed
coupon bonds, and asset-backed issues. The data set contains information on the seniority level of
the bonds. I am thus able to divide our data sample into senior secured and junior subordinated
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bonds. I manually delete all data entry errors. Moreover, to control for the possibility of residual
errors, I windsorize our database at the 1% and 99% level. Finally, to compute corporate bond
credit spreads, I use zero-coupon yields available from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP).
D. Diﬀerence in Beliefs Proxy
To obtain a proxy of ﬁrm-speciﬁc belief disagreement, I follow the procedure in Buraschi, Trojani,
and Vedolin (2008). I use analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share from the Institutional Brokers
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database and compute for each ﬁrm the mean absolute diﬀerence of
analysts’ earning forecasts scaled by an indicator of earnings uncertainty. In order to get a common
belief disagreement factor for the index, I estimate a dynamic component using factor analysis for
the analysts’ earning forecasts. Factor analysis has mainly been implemented for forecasting mea-
sures of macroeconomic activity and inﬂation (see, e.g., Stock and Watson 2002a, 2002b, 2004) and
more recently in ﬁnancial applications (see Ludvigson and Ng, 2007 and 2009). Dynamic factor
models allows us to escape the limitations of existing empirical analyzes in several dimensions. If
comovement between individual diﬀerence in beliefs is strong, it makes sense to represent the over-
all belief disagreement in the economy by an index or a few factors, which describe the common
behavior of these variables. Using dynamic factors instead of static principal components has two
reasons. First, I want it to be dynamic. Static factor analysis allows only for a contemporaneous
relation in the cross-section. However, empirical evidence points towards lagged eﬀects of increases
in uncertainty across diﬀerent industries. Second, I want to allow for cross-correlation among the
idiosyncratic components, because orthogonality is an unrealistic assumption in our setting. I esti-
mate the common belief disagreement process according to Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin (2000).
Generalized dynamic factor models are usually characterized by a large time series dimension and a
small cross section. Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin (2000) generalize the dynamic factor models
by allowing for a limited amount of cross-correlation among the idiosyncratic components. The
main idea is that the panel of belief disagreement processes can be decomposed into the sum of two
non-observable, mutually orthogonal parts, namely the common component and the idiosyncratic
component. I disregard the idiosyncratic component, because it is the common component I am
interested in. In the dynamic factor approach, the common component results from the interaction
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of a small number of unobservable shocks. Since the common component is unobservable, it has
to be estimated from aggregating the disagreement proxies in the panel. The intuition is that the
aggregation will eliminate the idiosyncratic component.
I now shortly outline the estimation procedure, however, for a more thorough description the reader
is referred to the Appendix B and further technicalities can be found in Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and
Reichlin (2000). The estimation consists of two steps. In the ﬁrst step, I estimate the spectral
density matrix of the common and idiosyncratic components by means of a dynamic principal com-
ponent procedure. From the spectral density matrices, I can derive the covariances of the common
component by applying the Fourier transform. In a second step, I estimate the factor space. From
the covariances estimated in the ﬁrst step, I estimate the generalized principal components as linear
combinations of the observable belief disagreement processes. The key idea is that these generalized
principal components14 have the smallest idiosyncratic-common variance ratio (for further technical
details, see Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin, 2000). To estimate the common component, I weight
the individual belief disagreement processes of each ﬁrm by its market capitalization.
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E. Other Control Variables
Leverage is a natural variable to include in the regressions and it is deﬁned as total debt divided
by total asset value. Fama and French (1992) suggest that size is a potential risk factor in the
cross-section of stock returns and it is reasonable to assume that size impacts on the cross-section
of option prices. Firm size is deﬁned as the natural log of the ﬁrm’s market value of equity, in
thousands of dollars. Firms which are highly correlated with the market are potentially useful to
hedge market risk. I therefore expect ﬁrms which are more exposed to market risk (as proxied by the
market beta) to have a more negative risk-neutral skewness. The ﬁrm’s market beta is calculated
from a regression from the stock excess returns on the market excess returns.
Following earlier work (see Hansen and Singleton, 1983), aggregate consumption is measured as the
seasonally adjusted real consumption of nondurables plus services. Consumption volatility is then
estimated from a Markov Chain as in Hamilton (1989). The state conditional volatilities are 0.423
14For a formal treatment of generalized eigenvalues and eigenvectors, see Wilkinson (1965).
15For robustness, I also used equal weights for the common component. The results remain quantitatively the
same.
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and 0.182 for the high and low state, respectively. The volatility regimes are persistent given that
the probability of remaining in one state is 0.992 for the high state and 0.973 for the low state. The
ﬁltered volatility is then calculated as:
휎ˆ푐 = 휋(푡)휎 + (1− 휋(푡)) 휎,
where 휋(푡) is the ﬁltered probability of a high volatility state, 휎 is set to 0.423 and 휎 is equal to 0.182.
Corradi, Distaso, and Mele (2009) document a signiﬁcant impact of macro-economic variables on
the index volatility risk premium. While the consumption volatility captures the macro-economic
uncertainty, I construct a macroeconomic level factor by extracting the ﬁrst principal component
using industrial production, housing start number, the producer price index, non-farm employment,
and the S&P 500 P/E ratio. I retrieve S&P 500 price-earnings data from the S&P webpage, and
the other macro variables I get from FRED.
Summary statistics of the main variables and diﬀerent uncertainty proxies are presented in Table
1. In Panel A, I present the 5th, median, and 95th percentile of the implied volatility, realized
volatility, and risk-neutral skewness for the years 1996 to 2008. A clear pattern is apparent. The
implied and realized volatilities seem to move in lock step. Both peak around 2000, during the
dot-com bubble, then descent and regain momentum in 2007 and 2008.
16
The median risk-neutral
skewness is negative, which indicates a left-skewed distribution of average. It reaches its lowest
level in 2000, when the 5th percentile is around -5.2. There are some periods, where the median
volatility risk premium turns negative. For instance in the year 1998, the volatility risk premium is
almost -1%. Panel B presents the average summary statistics for the main variables together with
their unconditional correlations with the volatility risk premium and the risk-neutral skewness. To
calculate the unconditional correlation, I ﬁrst estimate the correlation ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm and then average
in the time-series. The average ﬁrm-speciﬁc disagreement is almost 30%, the common disagreement
is 9%, and the consumption volatility is 0.35%. The consumption growth volatility is highly persis-
tent with a autocorrelation coeﬃcient of 0.96. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc and common disagreement proxies
are less persistent with values of 0.45 and 0.6, respectively. The macro factor displays a very high
autocorrelation of 0.96.
16Using a diﬀerent measure of the risk-neutral volatility, Conrad, Dittmar, and Ghysels (2008) ﬁnd a very similar
result.
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[Insert Table 1 approximately here.]
III. Empirical Analysis
A. Determinants of Volatility Risk Premia and Skewness in the Cross-Section
To test the impact of the volatility of consumption growth and disagreement on the volatility risk
premium and skewness, I run the following set of panel regressions:
푦푖(푡) = 훽0 + 훽1퐷퐼퐵푖,푡 + 훽2퐷퐼퐵푡 +
6∑
푗=3
훽푗Control(푗)푖,푡 +
3∑
푘=1
훾푘Control푡 + 휖푖,푡,
where 푦푖(푡) is the volatility risk premium and skewness of ﬁrm 푖, 퐷퐼퐵푖,푡 is the proxy of belief
disagreement of each individual ﬁrm 푖 at time 푡, 퐷퐼퐵푡 the common disagreement estimated from
the cross-section of individual disagreement proxies, Control푖,푡 are leverage, ﬁrm size, and market
beta of each ﬁrm 푖 at time 푡, and Control푡 is the macro factor. Table 6 reports the results.
[Insert Table 6 approximately here.]
All uncertainty measures load positively on the volatility risk premium and the risk-neutral skewness
and are economically and statistically signiﬁcant. For instance, a one standard deviation change in
the ﬁrm speciﬁc (common) disagreement induces a 1% (0.5%) change in the volatility risk premium,
similarly, a 1% standard deviation change in the consumption growth volatility yields a 0.4% change
in the volatility risk premium. Leverage is positively correlated with the volatility risk premium
and it is statistically signiﬁcant for all speciﬁcations. The other ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors such as the
ﬁrm size or the market beta are not signiﬁcant. The aggregate macro factor is signiﬁcant and loads
negatively on the volatility risk premium which points towards the counter-cyclical nature of the
volatility risk premia. As already noted in the example in the introduction, leverage could be an
important variable when studying the cross-section of volatility risk premia. As outlined in the
example, the low leverage ﬁrms, on average, change their sign more often than the high leverage
ﬁrms. Moreover, the average volatility risk premium of the low leverage ﬁrms is 30% lower than
for the high leverage ﬁrms. To better understand the impact of leverage on the volatility risk
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premia, I stratify all ﬁrms into three diﬀerent leverage bins. The results are presented in the lower
panel of Table 6. Low, medium, and high indicate the lower, medium, and higher tercile of the
leverage distribution across all ﬁrms. For the low leverage ﬁrms, I notice that the sign of the slope
coeﬃcient of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc disagreement and consumption volatility is negative, meaning that a
higher idiosyncratic disagreement and consumption growth volatility implies a lower volatility risk
premium. The estimated coeﬃcient for the common disagreement proxy remains positive across all
leverage bins, however, for the median bin, the estimated coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10% level only.
B. Predictability Regressions
Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009), and Zhou (2009) document the strong predictive power of
the market volatility risk premium for excess market returns and the default premium, deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between the Moody’s BAA and AAA corporate bond spreads. Cast in a model with
long-run risk, the authors ﬁnd that the entire time-variation in the variance risk premium comes
from the assumption of a stochastic volatility of consumption growth volatility and hence a higher
persistency of the stochastic volatility will induce predictability in returns.
In the following, I seek to examine the cross-sectional relationship between individual volatility risk
premia/risk-neutral skewness and the cross-section of stock returns and credit spreads. To this end,
I regress monthly equity excess returns on the individual volatility risk premia:
푥푟푖(푡+ ℎ) = 훼 + 훽1푉 표푙푅푃푖(푡) + 휖(푡 + ℎ),
where 푥푟푖 is the excess return of stock 푖 or the credit spread of ﬁrm 푖 and ℎ goes to horizon 12
months. The results are reported in Table 7.
[Insert Table 7 approximately here.]
The degree of predictability, as measured by the adjusted 푅2, starts out rather low but reaches a
peak at eight months with an adjusted 푅2 of 8% and then drops by 50% at a horizon of one year.
The size of the estimated coeﬃcient remains remarkably robust across all horizons. On average, a
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1% deviation change in the volatility risk premium leads to a 0.6% change in the excess stock return.
The pattern for the individual volatility risk premia and stock excess returns is similar to the ones
found in Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009) for the index. However, the estimated coeﬃcients
in my regressions are on average more signiﬁcant than in their regression. While for the index,
the volatility risk premium has no predictive power after a horizon of six months, the estimated
coeﬃcients for the individual volatility risk premia remain statistically signiﬁcant up to one year
with a t-statistic of 2.02 at the 12 month horizon. Panel B presents estimated coeﬃcients for the
credit spread predictability regressions. The estimated coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant across
all horizons with t-statistics ranging from 2.02 to 5.29. Interestingly, the predictive power of the
volatility risk premium displays a very similar pattern as for the stock excess returns: The adjusted
푅2 starts at 0.1 and then peaks around the eight month horizon and then tends to taper oﬀ for the
longer horizons.
Summarizing, the regressions reveal that the volatility risk premium or the diﬀerence between the
risk-neutral and physical expected variance captures an important component not only in stock but
also in credit markets. The model suggests a structural explanation for this reduced-form result.
B.1. Cyclical versus Non-Cyclical Firms
The example in the introduction has hinted that the eﬀect of macro-economic uncertainty on the
volatility risk premium could possibly a function of the business cycle. In line with this supposition,
Beber and Brandt (2008) empirically document that cyclical stocks are more exposed to macro-
economic uncertainty than non-cyclical stocks. In the economy I posit, a higher macro-economic
uncertainty should lead to a higher volatility risk premia and therefore it is natural to expect that
ﬁrms that are more exposed to the overall business cycle should also be more aﬀected by uncertainty.
To verify this hypothesis more formally, I ﬁrst test the impact of uncertainty on the volatility risk
premium for cyclical versus non-cyclical ﬁrms. I do this by running separate regressions for the two
sets of ﬁrms. I then re-run the predictability regressions for both cyclical and non-cyclical ﬁrms.
To this end, I sort each ﬁrm in industries and industries I divide into cyclical and non-cyclical
ones. Industry classiﬁcations are based on Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1994), who sort
industries by their correlation between industry level output growth and aggregate output growth.
I label the ﬁve industries with the highest output growth beta as cyclical and the ﬁve industries
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with the lowest output growth beta as non-cyclical. The results for the volatility risk premia are
presented in Table 8.
[Insert Table 8 approximately here.]
The estimated coeﬃcient for the uncertainty measures are highly signiﬁcant for both the cyclical
and non-cyclical ﬁrms, the size of the coeﬃcients, however, is more than twice as large for the
cyclical ﬁrms than for the non-cyclical ones. This indicates that the impact of uncertainty on
the cyclical ﬁrms is larger. Within the model I study, a higher exposure of cyclical stocks to
uncertainty is natural as those ﬁrms which correlate more with the aggregate output are more
prone to higher volatility risk and therefore should also carry a higher risk premium to compensate
for the uncertainty. In Table 9, I present the estimated coeﬃcients for the predictability regressions
for both cyclical and non-cyclical ﬁrms.
[Insert Table 9 approximately here.]
The results reveal that the predictive power of the volatility risk premium for both the stock excess
returns and corporate credit spreads is higher for cyclical stocks than for non-cyclical stocks. The
estimated coeﬃcients are larger in absolute size and the t-statistics are on average more than twice
as large. In terms of adjusted 푅2, the volatility risk premium of cyclical stocks is 10% at a one year
horizon, whereas for the non-cyclical stocks, the adjusted 푅2 amounts to only 4%.
IV. Conclusions
This paper develops an equilibrium model with heterogeneous beliefs and stochastic macroeconomic
uncertainty to explain individual volatility risk premia in the cross-section of stocks. I develop a
multi-asset Lucas (1978) economy in which uncertainty about ﬁrms growth opportunities induces
agents to disagree about expected cash ﬂows and a market-wide business cycle signal. The volatility
of cash ﬂow growth rates and the signal is modeled as a two-state Markov switching process which
allows time-varying macroeconomic uncertainty to have a bearing on agents’ disagreement. These
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features generate two sources of risk in equilibrium: Priced disagreement and macroeconomic un-
certainty risk. In equilibrium, when belief heterogeneity and macro-economic uncertainty vary over
time, they drive a substantial fraction of the volatility of asset returns. I study these model impli-
cations theoretically within a calibrated model and link them directly to the diﬀerential empirical
pricing patterns of individual options.
The more speciﬁc characteristics of my model are as follows: Consumption growth volatility and
disagreement are time-varying and are allowed to impact on the volatility risk premia via the
stochastic discount factor. A higher disagreement on future cash ﬂows induces a higher volatility
and negative skewness for medium to high leveraged ﬁrms. For ﬁrms with low leverage, it is possible
that the risk-neutral skewness turns positive. The economic reason is due to the diﬀerent sensitivities
of the default option embedded in stock returns: For low leverage companies, this option is far out-
of-the-money and its value is more sensitive to changes in skewness. For high leverage companies,
the default option is closer to be in-the-money and the opposite holds. In my economy, agents have
time-separable utility and the diﬀusions of the fundamental process and the consumption growth
volatility are assumed independent. In this case, in an economy without disagreement, the diﬀerence
between the risk-neutral and physical expected volatility would be equal to zero. If disagreement is
a priced risk factor, the wedge is entirely driven by agents’ uncertainty and the time-varying macro-
economic risk. Calibrating the model, I conﬁrm several of the empirical ﬁndings. Both disagreement
and realized conditional consumption growth volatility matter in their implications for volatility risk
premia, and I ﬁnd the ﬁrst source to dominate. Shutting down the stochastic volatility of cash ﬂow
growth, I ﬁnd that the level of volatility risk premia is mainly explained by the diﬀerence in beliefs.
However, higher order moments, such as the persistence, skewness, and kurtosis of the risk premia
are driven, to a large extent, by economic uncertainty. A simulation exercise shows that the model
is able to replicate the predictability of stock excess returns and corporate credit spreads. Moreover,
the estimated coeﬃcients correspond in sign and size approximately to their empirical counterparts.
This paper is a ﬁrst step towards a uniﬁed study of agents’ (disagreement) and macro-economic
uncertainty, and I hope to give credence to the hypothesis that both subjective agents’ uncertainty
and realized objective uncertainty could matter for volatility risk premia of stocks.
To empirically test the model predictions, I construct model-free measures of volatility risk premia
(see Carr and Madan, 1998 and Britten-Jones and Neuberger, 2000) and risk-neutral skewness
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(Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan, 2003) from stock option prices using data from January 1996 to
September 2008. Following Hamilton (1989), I estimate a Markov chain process for the second
moment of consumption growth to get a measure of the conditional volatility of fundamentals.
In addition, I build a forward-looking measure of disagreement about future cash ﬂows of ﬁrms
based on forecasts of corporate earnings. The separation of the two uncertainty channels has an
empirical appeal. By its forward-looking construction, disagreement captures perceptions of risk
looming on investors’ horizon. Thus, it conveys information over and above the one contained in the
conditional volatility of consumption which is estimated using historical data. In addition to the
conditional volatility of consumption growth, I construct a forward-looking measure of disagreement
about future cash ﬂows of ﬁrms based on forecasts of corporate earnings. Simple panel regressions
reveal that both disagreement and the conditional volatility of consumption matter for volatility risk
premia and outperform the explanatory content of other factors known to aﬀect these risk premia.
For instance, a one standard deviation change in ﬁrm-speciﬁc disagreement increases the volatility
risk premium by 0.5%, which corresponds to one third of the average volatility risk premium in
the cross-section of stocks. A slightly smaller change is induced by the conditional volatility of
consumption growth. Disagreement and time-varying consumption growth account for 12% of the
variation of volatility risk premia in the cross-section. I also ﬁnd that the volatility risk premia of
cyclical stocks are more exposed to uncertainty than non-cyclical stocks. For instance, the estimated
coeﬃcient for uncertainty on cyclical stocks is twice as large as for non-cyclical ones. The empirical
assessment also reveals that the impact of uncertainty on the volatility risk premia can be positive
or negative depending on the leverage level. For low leverage ﬁrms, the uncertainty proxies induce
a decrease in the volatility risk premia, whereas for high leverage ﬁrms, the eﬀect is the opposite.
I also present evidence that the volatility risk premium contains forecasting power for both the
cross-section of stock excess returns and corporate credit spreads. Similar to previous results in
the literature for the index volatility risk premium, I ﬁnd that predictability of the stock excess
returns is strongest in the short run: The predictive power of the individual volatility risk premia
is strongest at a horizon of eight months and then steadily declines. An analogue pattern is found
for corporate credit spreads.
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A Proofs
A.1 Learning
The disagreement dynamics in our economy follows in a straightforward way, once I can condition on the steady-state
volatility of the ﬁltered growth rate dynamics. The dynamics of the individual beliefs are:
푑푚퐴(푡) = (푎0 + 푎1푚
퐴(푡))푑푡 + 훾퐴(푡)퐴′퐵−1푑푊 1푌 (푡),
푑푚퐵(푡) = (푎0 + 푎1푚
퐵(푡))푑푡 + 훾퐵(푡)퐴′(퐵퐵′)−1(푚퐴(푡)−푚퐵(푡))푑푡 + 훾퐵(푡)퐴′퐵−1푑푊퐴푌 (푡) ,
using the symmetry of 퐵. The dynamics of Ψ(푡) = 퐵−1(푚퐴(푡)−푚퐵(푡)) follows, as:
푑Ψ(푡) = 퐵−1
(
푎1 + 훾
퐵(푡)퐴′(퐵퐵′)−1
)
(푚퐴(푡)−푚퐵(푡))푑푡 +퐵−1
(
훾퐴(푡)− 훾퐵(푡)
)
퐴′퐵−1푑푊퐴푌 (푡)
= 퐵−1
(
푎1퐵 + 훾
퐵(푡)퐴′퐵−1
)
Ψ(푡)푑푡+퐵−1
(
훾퐴(푡)− 훾퐵(푡)
)
퐴′퐵−1푑푊퐴푌 (푡),
with initial condition Ψ(0) = 퐵−1(푚퐴(0)−푚퐵(0)). The solution of this stochastic diﬀerential condition is:
Ψ(푡) = exp
{∫ 푡
0
푀(푠)푑푠
}
Ψ(0) +
∫ 푡
0
exp
{∫ 푠
0
푀(푢)푑푢
}
퐵−1
(
훾퐴(푠)− 훾퐵(푠)
)
퐴′퐵−1푑푊 1푌 (푠), (12)
where 푀(푠) = 퐵−1
(
푎1퐵 + 훾
퐵(푠)퐴′퐵−1
)
. It follows that Ψ(푡) is normally distributed as:
Ψ(푡) ∼ 풩
(
푒
∫
푡
0
푀(푠)푑푠Ψ(0),
∫ 푡
0
푒
∫
푠
0
푀(푢)푑푢퐵−1(훾퐴(푠)− 훾퐵(푠))퐴′(퐵퐵′)−1퐴
(
훾퐴(푠)− 훾퐵(푠)
)′
퐵−1푒
∫
푠
0
푀(푢)푑푢푑푠
)
.
The parameter 푏 = 푑푖푎푔(휎휇퐴1 , 휎휇퐴2 , 휎휇푧 ) in the dynamics for 훾(푡) impacts the distribution of 푚(푡) directly via the
Markovian structure.
A.2 Equilibrium Quantities
For completeness, I derive all equilibrium quantities in this Appendix. The proofs follow grossly Basak (2005).
(i) Dynamics of the stochastic weighting process 휆: Itoˆ’s Lemma applied to 휂(푡) = 휉퐴(푡)/휉퐵(푡) gives:
푑휂(푡) =
푑휉퐴(푡)
휉퐵(푡)
−
휉퐴(푡)
(휉퐴(푡))
2 푑휉
퐵(푡) +
1
2
2휉퐴(푡)
(휉퐵(푡))
3
(
푑휉퐵(푡)
)2
−
1
(휉퐵(푡))
2 푑휉
퐵(푡)푑휉퐴(푡).
Since markets are complete, there exists a unique stochastic discount factor for each agent. Absence of arbitrage
implies for 푛 = 퐴,퐵:
푑휉푛(푡)
휉푛(푡)
= −푟(푡)푑푡 − 휃푛(퐴1(푡), 퐴2(푡), 푧(푡))
′푑푊푛푌 ,
where 휃푛 = (휃푛퐴1(푡), 휃
푛
퐴2
(푡), 휃푛푧 (푡))
′ is the vector of market prices of risk perceived by agent 푖. It then follows,
푑휂(푡) =
휉퐴(푡)
휉퐵(푡)
푑휉퐴(푡)
휉퐴(푡)
−
휉퐴(푡)
휉퐵(푡)
푑휉퐵(푡)
휉퐵(푡)
+
휉퐴(푡)
휉퐵(푡)
(
푑휉퐵(푡)
휉퐵(푡)
)2
−
1
(휉퐵(푡))
2 푑휉
퐵(푡)푑휉퐴(푡),
= 휂(푡)
(
− 푟(푡)푑푡 − 휃1퐴(푡)푑푊퐴(푡)− 휃
1
푧(푡)푑푊푧(푡)−
(
−푟(푡)푑푡 − 휃2퐴(푡)푑푊퐴(푡)− 휃
2
푧(푡)푑푊푧(푡)
)
+
((
휃2퐴(푡)
)2
+
(
휃2푧(푡)
)2
− 휃1퐴(푡)휃
2
퐴(푡)− 휃
1
푧(푡)휃
2
푧(푡)
)
푑푡
)
. (13)
The prices of the stock and the defaultable bond in my economy follow the dynamics:
푑푆푖(푡) = 푆푖(푡)
(
휇푆푖(푡)푑푡+ 휎푆푖퐴푖푑푊퐴푖(푡) + 휎푆푗퐴푗푑푊퐴푘(푡) + 휎푆푖푧푑푊푧(푡)
)
, (14)
푑퐵퐷푖 (푡) = 퐵
퐷
푖 (푡)
(
휇퐵퐷푖 (푡)푑푡 + 휎퐵퐷푖 퐴푖푑푊퐴푖(푡) + 휎퐵퐷푗 퐴푗푑푊퐴푗 (푡) + 휎퐵퐷푖 푧푑푊푧(푡)
)
, (15)
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where 푆푖(푡) is the price of equity and 퐵
푑
푖 (푡) the price of the defaultable bond, and the expected growth rates 휇푆푖(푡)
and 휇퐵푑푖 (푡) and the volatility coeﬃcients 휎푆푖퐴푖(푡), 휎퐵퐷푖 퐴푖(푡), 휎푆푖푧(푡) and 휎퐵푑푖 푧(푡) are determined in equilibrium and
푖 ∕= 푗. It is easily shown that the diﬀerence in the perceived rates of return have to satisfy the consistency condition:
휇퐴푖 (푡)− 휇
퐵
푖 (푡) = 휎푖
(
Ψ퐴1(푡),Ψ퐴2(푡), 훼퐴1Ψ퐴1(푡)
휎퐴1
휎푧
+ 훼퐴2Ψ퐴2(푡)
휎퐴2
휎푧
+ 훽Ψ푧(푡)
)′
,
where 푖 denotes security 푖. The deﬁnition of market price of risk yields:
휎푖퐴1휃
푛
퐴1(푡) + 휎푖퐴2휃
푛
퐴2(푡) + 휎푖푧휃
푛
푧 (푡) = 휇
푛
푖 (푡)− 푟(푡).
After some simple algebra, I obtain:
휎푖퐴1 (푡)
(
휃퐴퐴1(푡)− 휃
퐵
퐴1
)
+ 휎푖퐴2(푡)
(
휃퐴퐴2(푡)− 휃
퐵
퐴2
)
+ 휎푛푧(푡)
(
휃퐴푧 (푡)− 휃
퐵
푧 (푡)
)
= 휎푖퐴1 (푡)Ψ퐴1(푡) + 휎푖퐴2 (푡)Ψ퐴2(푡)
+휎푛푧(푡)
(
훼퐴1Ψ퐴1(푡)
휎퐴1
휎푧
+ 훼퐴2Ψ퐴2(푡)
휎퐴2
휎푧
+ 훽Ψ푧(푡)
)
.
Since this equation has to hold for any 휎푛퐴푖(푡) and 휎푛푧(푡), it follows:
휃퐴퐴푖(푡)− 휃
퐵
퐴푖(푡) = Ψ퐴푖(푡),
휃퐴푧 (푡)− 휃
퐵
푧 (푡) =
(
훼퐴1Ψ퐴1(푡)
휎퐴1
휎푧
+ 훼퐴2Ψ퐴2(푡)
휎퐴2
휎푧
+ 훽Ψ푧(푡)
)
.
By construction, I also have:
푑푊퐴푖(푡) =
푚푛퐴푖(푡)− 휇퐴푖(푡)
휎퐴푖
푑푡+ 푑푊푛퐴푖(푡),
푑푊푧(푡) =
(
훼퐴1
푚푛퐴1(푡)− 휇퐴1(푡)
휎푧
+ 훼퐴2
푚푛퐴2(푡)− 휇퐴2(푡)
휎푧
+ 훽
푚푛푧 (푡)− 휇푧(푡)
휎푧
+ 푑푊푛푧 (푡)
)
.
Therefore, after substituting in equation (13), I get:
푑휂(푡)
휂(푡)
= −푑푊퐴퐴1(푡)Ψ퐴1(푡)− 푑푊
퐴
퐴2(푡)Ψ퐴2(푡)− 휃
퐴
푧 (푡)푑푊
퐴
푧 (푡)
+휃퐵푧 (푡)
(
푑푊퐴푧 (푡) + 훼퐴1Ψ퐴1(푡)
휎퐴1
휎푧
+ 훼퐴2Ψ퐴2(푡)
휎퐴2
휎푧
+ 훽Ψ푧(푡)
)
+
((
휃퐴퐴1(푡)−Ψ퐴1(푡)
)2
+
(
휃퐴퐴2(푡)−Ψ퐴2(푡)
)2
+ 휃퐵푧 (푡)
(
휃퐵푧 (푡)− 휃
퐴
푧 (푡)
)
−휃퐴퐴1(푡)
(
휃퐴퐴1(푡)−Ψ퐴1(푡)
)
− 휃퐴퐴2(푡)
(
휃퐴퐴2(푡)−Ψ퐴2(푡)
) )
푑푡,
= −푑푊퐴퐴1(푡)Ψ퐴1(푡)− 푑푊
퐴
퐴2(푡)Ψ퐴2(푡)− 푑푊
퐴
푧 (푡)
(
훼퐴1Ψ퐴1(푡)
휎퐴1
휎푧
+ 훼퐴2Ψ퐴2(푡)
휎퐴2
휎푧
+ 훽Ψ푧(푡)
)
.
(ii) Representative investor optimization and optimal consumption policies: The representative agent in
the economy faces the following optimization problem:
sup
푐퐴퐴푖
(푡)+푐퐵퐴푖
(푡)=퐴푖(푡)
푈 푖(푐퐴퐴푖(푡), 푐
퐵
퐴푖(푡), 휆(푡)) =
푐퐴퐴푖(푡)
1−훾
1− 훾
+ 휆(푡)
푐퐵퐴푖(푡)
1−훾
1− 훾
, (16)
where 휆(푡) > 0. Optimality of individual consumption plans implies that the stochastic weight takes the following
form:
휆(푡) = 푢′(푐퐴푖(푡))/푢
′(푐퐴푖(푡)) = 푦퐴휉
퐴(푡)/푦퐵휉
퐵(푡),
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where 푢′(푐퐴푖(푡)) = 푐퐴푖(푡)
−1/훾 is the marginal utility function, which is assumed identical across agents. The ﬁrst
order condition for agent 퐴 is:
푒−휌푡푐퐴푖(푡)
−훾 = 푦퐴휉
퐴(푡).
The ﬁrst order condition for agent 퐵 is:
휂(푡)푒−휌푡푐퐴1(푡)
−훾 = 푦퐵휉
퐴(푡).
The aggregate resource constraint can now be easily derived as:(
푦퐵휉
퐴(푡)푒휌푡
휂(푡)
)−1/훾
+
(
푦퐴휉
퐴(푡)푒휌푡
)−1/훾
= 퐴1(푡).
Thus, the solutions for the individual state price densities are:
휉퐴(푡) = 푒−휌푡
1
푦퐴
퐴푖(푡)
−훾
(
1 + 휆(푡)1/훾
)훾
, 휉퐵(푡) = 푒−휌푡
1
푦퐵
퐴푖(푡)
−훾
(
1 + 휆(푡)1/훾
)훾
휆(푡)−1.
To solve for the optimal consumption policy of each agent, I plug in the functional forms for the individual state
price densities:
푐퐴퐴푖(푡) = (푦퐴휉
퐴(푡)푒휌푡)−1/훾 = 퐴푖(푡)
(
1 + 휆(푡)1/훾
)−1
.
Good’s market clearing, ﬁnally implies:
푐퐵퐴푖(푡) = 퐴푖(푡)− 푐
퐴
퐴푖(푡) = 퐴푖(푡)휆(푡)
1/훾
(
1 + 휆(푡)1/훾
)−1
.
A.3 Security Prices
For convenience, I express everything in terms of ﬁrm 1. However, the formulas can easily be extended to ﬁrm 2, by
making the corresponding changes and adjusting for the relative price. By deﬁnition, the risk-less zero coupon bond
price is given by:
퐵1(푡, 푇 ) =
1
휉퐴(푡)
퐸퐴푡
(
푒−휌(푇−푡)휉퐴(푇 )
)
.
Using the expression for 휉퐴(푡), I get:
퐵1(푡, 푇 ) = 퐸
퐴
푡
(
푒−휌(푇−푡)
(
퐴1(푇 )
퐴1(푡)
)−훾 (
1 + 휆(푇 )1/훾
1 + 휆(푡)1/훾
)훾)
. (17)
Let
퐺 (푡, 푇, 푥; Ψ) ≡
∫ ∞
0
(
1 + 휆(푇 )1/훾
1 + 휆(푡)1/훾
)훾 [
1
2휋
∫ +∞
−∞
(
휆(푇 )
휆(푡)
)−푖휒
퐹Ψ (Ψ, 푡, 푇 ;−훾, 푖휒)푑휒
]
푑휆(푇 )
휆(푇 )
.
By Fourier inversion, it then follows:
퐵1(푡, 푇 ) = 푒
−휌(푇−푡)퐹푚퐴
(
푚퐴, 푡, 푇 ;−훾
)
퐺 (푡, 푇,−훾; Ψ) .
In a similar way, the ﬁrm value is:
푉1(푡) = 퐸
퐴
푡
(∫ ∞
푡
푒−휌(푢−푡)
휉퐴(푢)
휉퐴(푡)
퐴(푢)푑푢
)
,
= 퐴푖(푡)퐸
퐴
푡
(∫ ∞
푡
푒−휌(푢−푡)
(
1 + 휆(푡)1/훾
1 + 휆(푡)1/훾
)훾 (
퐴1(푢)
퐴1(푡)
)1−훾
푑푢
)
,
= 퐴1(푡)
∫ ∞
푡
(
푒−휌(푢−푡)퐹푚퐴(푚
퐴, 푡, 푢; 1− 훾)퐺 (푢, 푇, 1− 훾; Ψ)
)
푑푢.
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The price of the defaultable bond is:
퐵퐷1 (푡, 푇 ) = 퐾1퐵1(푡, 푇 )− 퐸
퐴
푡
(
푒−휌(푇−푡)
휉퐴(푇 )
휉퐴(푡)
(퐾1 − 푉1(푇 ))
+
)
,
= 퐾1퐵1(푡, 푇 )− 퐸
퐴
푡
(
푒−휌(푇−푡)
(
퐴1(푇 )
퐴1(푡)
)−훾 (
1 + 휆(푇 )1/훾
1 + 휆(푡)1/훾
)훾
(퐾1 − 푉1(푇 ))
+
)
,
= 퐾1퐵1(푡, 푇 )− 푃1(푡, 푇,퐾1),
where 푃1(푡, 푇,퐾1) is the price of the put option on the ﬁrm value. Equity in my economy is a call option on the ﬁrm
value. Therefore:
푆1(푡) = 퐸
퐴
푡
(
푒−휌(푇−푡)
휉퐴(푇 )
휉퐴(푡)
(푉1(푇 )− (퐾1 +퐾2))
+
)
= 퐶1(푡, 푇,퐾1 +퐾2).
A European call option on the equity value is derived in the following way:
푂1(푡, 푇 ) = 퐸
퐴
푡
(
푒−휌(푇−푡)
휉퐴(푇 )
휉퐴(푡)
(푆1(푇 )−퐾푒)
+
)
.
A.4 Risk-Neutral Skewness
Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003) show that one can express the 휏 maturity price of a security that pays the
quadratic, cubic, and quartic return on the base security as:
푉 (푡, 휏) =
∫ ∞
푆(푡)
2 (1− 푙푛 (퐾/푆(푡)))
퐾2
퐶(푡, 휏 ;퐾)푑퐾
+
∫ 푆(푡)
0
2 (1 + 푙푛 (퐾/푆(푡)))
퐾2
푃 (푡, 휏 ;퐾) 푑퐾,
푊 (푡, 휏) =
∫ ∞
푆(푡)
6푙푛 (퐾/푆(푡))− 3 (푙푛 (퐾/푆(푡)))2
퐾2
퐶 (푡, 휏 ;퐾) 푑퐾
+
∫ 푆(푡)
0
6푙푛 (퐾/푆(푡)) + 3 (푙푛 (퐾/푆(푡)))
2
퐾2
푃 (푡, 휏 ;퐾) 푑퐾,
푋(푡, 휏) =
∫ ∞
푆(푡)
12푙푛 (퐾/푆(푡))− 4 (푙푛 (퐾/푆(푡)))
2
퐾2
퐶 (푡, 휏 ;퐾) 푑퐾
+
∫ 푆(푡)
0
12푙푛 (퐾/푆(푡)) + 4 (푙푛 (퐾/푆(푡)))2
퐾2
푃 (푡, 휏 ;퐾) 푑퐾,
where 푉 (푡, 휏),푊 (푡, 휏), and 푋(푡, 휏) are the quadratic, cubic, and quadratic contracts, respectively, and 퐶(푡, 휏 ;퐾) and
푃 (푡, 휏 ;퐾) are the prices of European calls and puts written on the underlying stock 푆(푡) with strike price 퐾 and
maturity 휏 .
A.5 Stock Price Volatility and Volatility Risk Premia
The price of the stock satisﬁes a diﬀusion process which is given by:
푑푆1(푡)
푆1(푡)
= 휇퐴푆1(푡)푑푡 + 휎푆1퐴1(푡)푑푊
퐴
퐴1(푡) + 휎푆1퐴2(푡)푑푊
퐴
퐴2(푡) + 휎푆1푧(푡)푑푊
퐴
푧 (푡).
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The diﬀusion term is characterized by:
푑푆1(푡)− 푆1(푡)휇
퐴
푆1(푡)푑푡 =
∂푆1
∂퐴1
(
푑퐴1(푡)− 퐸
퐴
푡 (푑퐴1(푡))
)
+
∂푆1
∂푚퐴퐴1
(
푑푚퐴퐴1(푡)− 퐸
퐴
푡
(
푑푚퐴퐴1
))
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ퐴1
(
푑Ψ퐴1(푡)− 퐸
퐴
푡 (푑Ψ퐴1(푡))
)
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ퐴2
(
푑Ψ퐴2(푡)− 퐸
퐴
푡 (푑Ψ퐴2(푡))
)
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ푧
(
푑Ψ푧 − 퐸
퐴
푡 (푑Ψ푧(푡))
)
,
=
∂푆1
∂퐴1
퐴1휎퐴1푑푊
퐴
퐴1(푡)
+
∂푆1
∂푚퐴퐴1
(
훾퐴퐴1
휎퐴1
푑푊퐴퐴1 (푡) +
훾퐴퐴1퐴2
휎퐴2
푑푊퐴퐴2(푡) +
(
훼퐴1훾
퐴
퐴1
+ 훼퐴2훾
퐴
퐴1퐴2
+ 훽훾퐴퐴1푧
휎푧
)
푑푊퐴푧 (푡)
)
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ퐴1
((
훾퐴퐴1 − 훾
퐵
퐴1
휎2퐴1
)
푑푊퐴퐴1(푡) +
(
훾퐴퐴1퐴2 − 훾
퐴
퐴1퐴2
휎퐴1휎퐴2
)
푑푊퐴퐴2(푡)
+
(
훼퐴1
(
훾퐴퐴1 − 훾
퐵
퐴1
)
+ 훼퐴2
(
훾퐴퐴1퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴1퐴2
)
+ 훽
(
훾퐴퐴1푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴1푧
)
휎퐴1휎푧
)
푑푊퐴푧 (푡)
)
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ퐴2
((
훾퐴퐴1퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴1퐴2
휎퐴1휎퐴2
)
푑푊퐴퐴1(푡) +
(
훾퐴퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴2
휎2퐴2
)
푑푊퐴퐴2(푡)
+
(
훼퐴1
(
훾퐴퐴1퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴1퐴2
)
+ 훼퐴2
(
훾퐴퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴2
)
+ 훽
(
훾퐴퐴2푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴2푧
)
휎퐴2휎푧
)
푑푊퐴푧 (푡)
)
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ푧
((
훾퐴퐴1푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴1푧
휎퐴1휎푧
)
푑푊퐴퐴1(푡) +
(
훾퐴퐴2푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴2푧
휎퐴2휎푧
)
푑푊퐴퐴2(푡)
+
(
훼퐴1
(
훾퐴퐴1푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴1푧
)
+ 훼퐴2
(
훾퐴퐴2푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴2푧
)
+ 훽
(
훾퐴푧 − 훾
퐵
푧
)
휎2푧
)
푑푊퐴푧 (푡)
)
where
휎푆1퐴1(푡) =
1
푆1(푡)
(
∂푆1
∂퐴1
퐴1휎퐴1 +
∂푆1
∂푚퐴퐴1
훾퐴퐴1
휎퐴1
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ퐴1
(
훾퐴퐴1 − 훾
퐵
퐴1
휎2퐴1
)
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ퐴2
(
훾퐴퐴1퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴1퐴2
휎퐴1휎퐴2
)
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ푧
(
훾퐴퐴1푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴1푧
휎퐴1휎푧
))
,
휎푆1퐴2(푡) =
1
푆1(푡)
(
∂푆1
∂푚퐴퐴1
훾퐴퐴1퐴2
휎퐴2
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ퐴1
(
훾퐴퐴1퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴1퐴2
휎퐴1휎퐴2
)
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ퐴2
(
훾퐴퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴2
휎2퐴2
)
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ푧
(
훾퐴퐴2푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴2푧
휎퐴2휎푧
))
,
휎푆1푧(푡) =
1
푆1(푡)
(
∂푆1
∂푚퐴퐴1
(
훼퐴1훾
퐴
퐴1
+ 훼퐴2훾
퐴
퐴1퐴2
+ 훽훾퐴퐴1푧
휎푧
)
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ퐴1
(
훼퐴1
(
훾퐴퐴1 − 훾
퐵
퐴1
)
+ 훼퐴2
(
훾퐴퐴1퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴1퐴2
)
+ 훽
(
훾퐴퐴1푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴1푧
)
휎퐴1휎푧
)
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ퐴2
(
훼퐴1
(
훾퐴퐴1퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴1퐴2
)
+ 훼퐴2
(
훾퐴퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴2
)
+ 훽
(
훾퐴퐴2푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴2푧
)
휎퐴2휎푧
)
+
∂푆1
∂Ψ푧
(
훼퐴1
(
훾퐴퐴1푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴1푧
)
+ 훼퐴2
(
훾퐴퐴2푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴2푧
)
+ 훽
(
훾퐴푧 − 훾
퐵
푧
)
휎2푧
))
.
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Using the following the derivatives,
∂푆1
∂퐴1
=
∫ ∞
푡
푒−훿(푢−푡)퐹푚퐴
(
푚퐴, 푡, 푇 ; 휖퐴1, 휖퐴2
)
퐺 (푡, 푢, 1− 훾; Ψ) 푑푢,
∂푆1
∂푚퐴퐴1
= 퐴1
∫ ∞
푡
푒−훿(푢−푡)퐴 (푢− 푡)퐹푚퐴
(
푚퐴, 푡, 푇 ; 휖퐴1, 휖퐴2
)
퐺 (푡, 푢, 1− 훾; Ψ) 푑푢,
∂푆1
∂Ψ
= 퐴1
∫ ∞
푡
푒−훿(푢−푡) (퐵Ψ + 2퐶Ψ)퐹푚퐴
(
푚퐴, 푡, 푇 ; 휖퐴1, 휖퐴2
)
퐺 (푡, 푢, 1− 훾; Ψ)푑푢,
I can easily compute the stock volatility which is given by
(
휎2푆1퐴1(푡) + 휎
2
푆1퐴2
(푡) + 휎2푆1푧(푡)
)1/2
. The corresponding
coeﬃcients for the volatility of stock 2 are:
휎푆2퐴1(푡) =
1
푆2(푡)
(
∂푆2
∂푚퐴퐴2
(
훾퐴퐴1퐴2
휎퐴1
)
+
∂푆2
∂Ψ퐴1
(
훾퐴퐴1 − 훾
퐵
퐴1
휎2퐴1
)
+
∂푆2
∂Ψ퐴2
(
훾퐴퐴1퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴1퐴2
휎퐴1휎퐴2
)
+
∂푆2
∂Ψ푧
(
훾퐴퐴1푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴1푧
휎퐴1휎푧
))
,
휎푆2퐴2(푡) =
1
푆2(푡)
(
∂푆2
∂퐴2
퐴2휎퐴2 +
∂푆2
∂푚퐴퐴2
훾퐴퐴2
휎퐴2
+
∂푆2
∂Ψ퐴1
(
훾퐴퐴1퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴1퐴2
휎퐴1휎퐴2
)
+
∂푆2
∂Ψ퐴2
(
훾퐴퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴2
휎2퐴2
)
+
∂푆2
∂Ψ푧
(
훾퐴퐴2푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴2푧
휎퐴2휎푧
))
,
휎푆2푧(푡) =
1
푆2(푡)
(
∂푆2
∂푚퐴퐴2
(
훼퐴1훾
퐴
퐴1퐴2
+ 훼퐴2훾
퐴
퐴2
+ 훽훾퐴퐴2푧
휎푧
)
+
∂푆2
∂Ψ퐴1
(
훼퐴1
(
훾퐴퐴1 − 훾
퐵
퐴1
)
+ 훼퐴2
(
훾퐴퐴1퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴1퐴2
)
+ 훽
(
훾퐴퐴1푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴1푧
)
휎퐴1휎푧
)
+
∂푆2
∂Ψ퐴2
(
훼퐴1
(
훾퐴퐴1퐴2 − 훾
퐵
퐴1퐴2
)
+ 훽
(
훾퐴퐴2푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴2푧
)
휎퐴2휎푧
)
+
∂푆2
∂Ψ푧
(
훼퐴1
(
훾퐴퐴1푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴1푧
)
+ 훼퐴2
(
훾퐴퐴2푧 − 훾
퐵
퐴2푧
)
+ 훽
(
훾퐴푧 − 훾
퐵
푧
)
휎2푧
))
.
A.6 Proof of Laplace Transform
I ﬁrst summarize the most important ﬁltered dynamics needed to compute the Laplace transform. The disagreement
dynamics of ﬁrm 푖 are:
푑Ψ푖(푡) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
(
푎1푖 +
훾퐵푖
휎2푖
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
퐾1푖
Ψ푖(푡) +
훾퐵푖푗
휎푗휎푖︸ ︷︷ ︸
퐾1푗
Ψ푗(푡) +
(
훼푖훾
퐵
푖 + 훼푗훾
퐵
푖푗 + 훽훾
퐵
푖푧
)
휎푖휎푧︸ ︷︷ ︸
퐾1푧
Ψ푧(푡)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ 푑푡
+
(
훾퐴푖 − 훾
퐵
푖
휎2푖
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
휎1푖
푑푊퐴푖 (푡) +
(
훾퐴푖푗 − 훾
퐵
푖푗
휎푖휎푗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
휎1푗
푑푊퐴푗 (푡) +
1
휎푖휎푧
(
훼푖
(
훾퐴푖 − 훾
퐵
푖
)
+ 훼푗
(
훾퐴푖푗 − 훾
퐵
푖푗
)
+ 훽
(
훾퐴푖푧 − 훾
퐵
푖푧
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
휎1푧
푑푊퐴푧 (푡).
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Similarly, the disagreement dynamics of ﬁrm 푗 are given by:
푑Ψ푗(푡) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ 훾
퐵
푖푗
휎푗휎푖︸ ︷︷ ︸
퐾2푖
Ψ푖(푡) +
(
푎1푗 +
훾퐵푗
휎2푗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
퐾2푗
Ψ푗(푡) +
훼푖훾
퐵
푖푗 + 훼푗훾
퐵
푗 + 훽훾
퐵
푗푧
휎푗휎푧︸ ︷︷ ︸
퐾2푧
Ψ푧(푡)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ 푑푡
+
(
훾퐴푖푗 − 훾
퐵
푖푗
휎푖휎푗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
휎2푖
푑푊퐴푖 (푡) +
(
훾1푗 − 훾
퐵
푗
휎2푗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
휎2푗
푑푊퐴푗 (푡) +
1
휎푗휎푧
(
훼푖
(
훾퐴푖푗 − 훾
퐵
푖푗
)
+ 훼푗
(
훾퐴푗 − 훾
퐵
푗
)
+ 훽
(
훾퐴푗푧 − 훾
퐵
푗푧
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
휎2푧
푑푊퐴푧 (푡).
The disagreement about the signal growth rate is given by:
푑Ψ푧(푡) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝ 훾퐵푖푧휎푖휎푧︸ ︷︷ ︸
퐾3푖
Ψ푖(푡) +
훾2푗푧
휎푧휎푗︸ ︷︷ ︸
퐾3푗
Ψ푗(푡) +
(
푎1푧 +
1
휎2푧
(
훼푖훾
퐵
푖푧 + 훼푗훾
퐵
푗푧 + 훽훾
퐵
푧
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
퐾3푧
Ψ푧(푡)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ 푑푡
+
(
훾퐴푖푧 − 훾
퐵
푖푧
휎푖휎푧
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
휎3푖
푑푊퐴푖 (푡) +
(
훾퐴푗푧 − 훾
퐵
푗푧
휎푗휎푧
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
휎3푗
푑푊퐴푗 (푡) +
1
휎2푧
(
훼푖
(
훾퐴푖푧 − 훾
퐵
푖푧
)
+ 훼푗
(
훾퐴푗푧 − 훾
퐵
푗푧
)
+ 훽
(
훾퐴푧 − 훾
퐵
푧
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
휎3푧
푑푊퐴푧 (푡).
The growth rate of ﬁrm 푖 is given by:
푑푚퐴푖 (푡) =
(
푎0푖 + 푎1푖푚
퐴
푖 (푡)
)
푑푡+
훾퐴푖
휎푖︸︷︷︸
휎4푖
푑푊퐴푖 (푡) +
훾퐴푖푗
휎푗︸︷︷︸
휎4푗
푑푊퐴푗 (푡) +
훼푖훾
퐴
푖 + 훼푖훾
퐴
푖푗 + 훽훾
퐴
푖푧
휎푧︸ ︷︷ ︸
휎4푧
푑푊퐴푧 (푡).
Similarly, the growth rate of ﬁrm 푗 is given by:
푑푚퐴푗 (푡) =
(
푎0푗 + 푎1푗푚
퐴
푗 (푡)
)
푑푡+
훾퐴푖푗
휎푖︸︷︷︸
휎5푖
푑푊퐴푖 (푡) +
훾퐴푗
휎푗︸︷︷︸
휎5푗
푑푊퐴푗 (푡) +
훼푖훾
퐴
푖푗 + 훼푗훾
퐴
푗 + 훽훾
퐴
푗푧
휎푧︸ ︷︷ ︸
휎5푧
푑푊퐴푧 (푡).
The Radon-Nikodym derivative in this economy evolves according to:
푑휂(푡)
휂(푡)
= −
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣Ψ퐴푖(푡)푑푊퐴퐴푖 +Ψ퐴푗 (푡)푑푊퐴퐴푗 +
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝훼퐴푖휎퐴푖휎푧︸ ︷︷ ︸
훼¯퐴푖
Ψ퐴푖(푡) +
훼퐴푗휎퐴푗
휎푧︸ ︷︷ ︸
훼¯퐴푗
Ψ퐴푗 (푡) + 훽Ψ푧(푡)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ 푑푊퐴푧 (푡)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Finally, the fundamentals have the following dynamics:
푑퐴푖(푡)/퐴푖(푡) = 푚
퐴
푖 (푡)푑푡+ 휎푖︸︷︷︸
휎7푖
푑푊푖(푡)
퐴
푑퐴푗(푡)/퐴푗(푡) = 푚
퐴
푗 (푡)푑푡+ 휎푗︸︷︷︸
휎7푗
푑푊푗(푡)
퐴
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Let me collect all variables in the vector 푋 = (Ψ푖,Ψ푗 ,Ψ푧,푚푖,푚푗 , 휂, 퐴푖, 퐴푗)
′
, and all shocks in the vector 푊퐴 =(
푊퐴푖 ,푊
퐴
푗 ,푊
퐴
푧
)′
. I can now compactly write the dynamics of 푋 as:
푑푋 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
0
0
푎0푖
푎0푗
0
0
0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
퐾0
+
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
퐾1푖 퐾1푗 퐾1푧 0 0 0 0 0
퐾2푖 퐾2푗 퐾2푧 0 0 0 0 0
퐾3푖 퐾3푗 퐾3푧 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 푎1푖 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 푎1푗 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 퐴푖 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 퐴푗 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
퐾1
푋(푡)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
푑푡+
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
휎1푖 휎1푗 휎1푧
휎2푖 휎2푗 휎2푧
휎3푖 휎3푗 휎3푧
휎4푖 휎4푗 휎4푧
휎5푖 휎5푗 휎5푧
−휂휎ˆ6푖 −휂휎ˆ6푗 −휂휎ˆ6푧
퐴푖휎7푖 0 0
0 퐴푗휎8푗 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
푆
푑푊퐴(푡),
where hats in 휎ˆ6푖, 휎ˆ6푗 and 휎ˆ6푧 shall remind us that diﬀusion of
푑휂
휂 is a function of Ψ(푡). Let me also denote those
sub-blocks (yellow ones) of 퐾0,퐾1, 푆, which are related to Ψ(푡) by:
휅0 := 퐾0(1:3) = 03×1
휅1 := 퐾1(1:3,1:3)
Σ := 푆(1:3,1:3).
Thus, the dynamics of Ψ(푡) can be compactly written as:
푑Ψ(푡) = (휅0 + 휅1Ψ(푡)) 푑푡+Σ푑푊
퐴(푡).
Let 푚퐴(푡) = (푚퐴퐴1(푡)푚
퐴
퐴2
(푡)푚퐴푧 (푡)), then the joint Laplace transform of 푋(푡) is given by:
퐹푋 = 퐴
휀퐴푖
푖 퐴
휀퐴푗
푗 휂
휒퐹푚퐴퐹Ψ, (18)
where 퐹푚퐴 is aﬃne in 푚푖 and 푚푗 :
퐹푚퐴 = exp
(
퐴푚퐴 + 퐴¯푖(휏)푚푖 + 퐴¯푗(휏)푚푗
)
,
and 퐹Ψ푖,Ψ푗 ,Ψ푧 is aﬃne-quadratic in Ψ = (Ψ푖,Ψ푗,Ψ푧) :
퐹Ψ푖,Ψ푗 ,Ψ푧 = exp(퐴(휏) +퐵(휏)
′Ψ+Ψ′퐶(휏)Ψ).
In matrix notation, Feynman-Kacˇ implies:
∂퐹
∂푡
+
∂퐹
∂푋 ′
(퐾0 +퐾1푋) +
1
2
푇푟
(
∂2퐹
∂푋∂푋 ′
푆푆′
)
= 0
or
∂퐹
∂푡
+
11∑
푖=1
∂퐹
∂푋푖
(퐾0(푖) +퐾1(푖, :)푋) +
1
2
11∑
푖,푗=1
퐶푖푗
∂2퐹
∂푋푖∂푋푗
= 0,
where 퐶푖푗 is the 푖푗−th element of the matrix 퐶 = 푆푆
′. The goal is to reduce the problem of solving the PDE in 퐹푋 ,
to solving simply the PDE in 퐹Ψ, which can be done virtually in closed form. This requires several adjustments to
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the parameters of Ψ dynamics and the constants in the respective ODEs. More speciﬁcally, 퐴(휏), 퐵(휏), 퐶(휏) solve
the following system:
∂퐴
∂휏
= 퐵(휏)′휅¯0 + 푇푟 [퐶(휏)ΣΣ
′] +
1
2
퐵(휏)′ΣΣ′퐵(휏) +퐴푐 (ODE.1) (19)
∂퐵
∂휏
′
Ψ = 퐵(휏)′휅¯1Ψ+ 2휅¯
′
0퐶(휏)Ψ + 2푇푟 [퐵
′(휏)ΣΣ′퐶(휏)Ψ] +퐵′푐Ψ (ODE.2)
푇푟
[
∂퐶
∂휏
′
ΨΨ′
]
= 푇푟 [(퐶(휏)휅¯1 + 휅¯
′
1퐶(휏)) ΨΨ
′] + 2푇푟 [퐶(휏)ΣΣ′퐶(휏)ΨΨ′] + 푇푟 (퐶푐ΨΨ
′) (ODE.3),
where 휅¯0, 휅¯1 denote appropriately adjusted coeﬃcients 휅0, 휅1, and 퐴푐, 퐵푐, 퐶푐 are the adjusted constants.
Since the adjustments involve the cross-derivatives of 퐹 with respect to 푋, I spell out the Hessian matrix for
completeness:
∂2
∂푋∂푋 ′
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∂2
∂Ψ2푖
∂2
∂Ψ푖∂Ψ푗
∂2
∂Ψ푖∂Ψ푧
∂2
∂Ψ푖∂푚퐴2
∂2
∂Ψ푖∂푚퐴2
∂2
∂Ψ푖∂휂
∂2
∂Ψ푖∂퐴1
∂2
∂Ψ푖∂퐴2
∂2
∂Ψ2푗
∂2
∂Ψ푗∂Ψ푧
∂2
∂Ψ푗∂푚퐴2
∂2
∂Ψ푗∂푚퐴2
∂2
∂Ψ퐴2∂휂
∂2
∂Ψ푗∂퐴1
∂2
∂Ψ푗∂퐴2
∂2
∂Ψ2푧
∂2
∂Ψ푧∂푚퐴1
∂2
∂Ψ푧∂푚퐴2
∂2
∂Ψ푧∂휂
∂2
∂Ψ푧∂퐴1
∂2
∂Ψ푧∂퐴2
∂2
∂푚2퐴2
∂2
∂푚퐴2∂푚퐴2
∂2
∂푚퐴2∂휂
∂2
∂푚퐴2∂퐴1
∂2
∂푚퐴2∂퐴2
∂2
∂푚2퐴2
∂2
∂푚퐴2∂휂
∂2
∂푚퐴2∂퐴1
∂2
∂푚퐴2∂퐴2
∂2
∂휂2
∂2
∂휂∂퐴1
∂2
∂휂∂퐴2
∂2
∂퐴2
1
∂2
∂퐴1∂퐴2
∂2
∂퐴2
2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Types of adjustments:
1. Terms involving derivatives of the type ∂
2
∂Ψ푖∂푚푗
, 푖 = {퐴1, 퐴2, 푧}, 푗 = {퐴1, 퐴2} adjust the vector 휅0 in the drift
of Ψ.
2. Terms involving derivatives of the type ∂
2
∂Ψ푖∂퐴1
, ∂
2
∂Ψ푖∂퐴2
, 푖 = {퐴1, 퐴2, 푧} adjust the vector 휅0 in the drift of Ψ.
3. Terms involving derivatives of the type ∂
2
∂Ψ푖∂휂
, 푖 = {퐴1, 퐴2, 푧} adjust the mean reversion matrix 휅1 in the drift
of Ψ.
4. Terms involving derivatives of the type ∂
2
∂푚푖∂휂
, 푖 = {퐴1, 퐴2} adjust the constant vector 퐵푐 in the ODE.2.
5. Terms involving derivatives of the type ∂
2
∂휂∂퐴1
, ∂
2
∂휂∂퐴2
adjust the constant vector 퐵푐 in the ODE.2.
6. Terms involving derivatives of the type ∂
2
∂휂2 adjust the constant matrix 퐶푐 in the ODE.3.
For all the cases above, I need to consider the structure of 1푑푡
∂2
∂푋푖∂푋푗
⟨푑푋푖, 푑푋푗⟩ . Below I neglect the division by
1
푑푡
for brevity. Let us start with the adjustments of the constant drift matrix 휅0.
Adjustment 1:
∂2퐹
∂Ψ푖∂푚푗
where 푖 = {퐴1, 퐴2, 푧} and 푗 = {퐴1, 퐴2}
∂2퐹
∂Ψ푖∂푚퐴2
= ∂퐹∂Ψ푖 퐴¯퐴1 and ⟨푑Ψ푖, 푑푚퐴2⟩ =
∑
푖 휎1푖휎5푖
∂2퐹
∂Ψ푖∂푚퐴2
= ∂퐹∂Ψ푖 퐴¯퐴2 and ⟨푑Ψ푖, 푑푚퐴2⟩ =
∑
푖 휎1푖휎6푖
... and ...
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I need to add the following vector to 휅0 :
휅푎푑푗10 =
⎛⎝ 퐴¯퐴1 ∑푖 휎1푖휎5푖 + 퐴¯퐴2 ∑푖 휎1푖퐴¯퐴1 ∑푖 휎2푖휎5푖 + 퐴¯퐴2 ∑푖 휎2푖
퐴¯퐴1
∑
푖 휎3푖휎5푖 + 퐴¯퐴2
∑
푖 휎3푖
⎞⎠ =
⎛⎝ 휎(1,:)휎(2,:)
휎(3,:)
⎞⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
3×3
(
퐴¯퐴1휎
′
(5,:) + 퐴¯퐴2휎
′
(6,:)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
3×1
.
Adjustment 2:
∂2퐹
∂Ψ푖∂퐼
, 푖 = {퐴1, 퐴2, 푧}, 퐼 = {퐴1, 퐴2}
∂2퐹
∂Ψ푖∂퐴1
= ∂퐹∂Ψ푖
휀퐴1
퐴1
and ⟨푑Ψ푖, 푑퐴1⟩ = 퐴1휎1푖휎9퐴1
∂2퐹
∂Ψ푖∂퐴2
= ∂퐹∂Ψ푖
휀퐴2
퐴2
and ⟨푑Ψ푖, 푑퐴1⟩ = 퐴2휎1푗휎10퐴2
... and ...
Adjustment 2 adds the following vector to 휅0:
휅푎푑푗20 =
⎛⎝ 휀퐴1휎1푖휎9퐴1 + 휀퐴2휎1푗휎10퐴2휀퐴1휎2퐴1휎9퐴1 + 휀퐴2휎2퐴2휎10퐴2
0
⎞⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
3×1
,
where 0 in the last row of 휅푎푑푗20 follows from the independence between the disagreement on the signal and 퐴1 and
퐴2 dynamics.
Summarizing, Adj 1 and Adj 2 imply that the adjusted vector 휅¯0 in the drift of Ψ is:
휅¯0 = 휅0 + 휅
푎푑푗1
0 + 휅
푎푑푗2
0 .
Adjustment 3 Next consider the terms that can be absorbed into the mean reversion matrix 휅1. Those involve
∂2퐹
∂Ψ푖∂휂
, 푖 = {퐴1, 퐴2, 푧}.
∂2퐹
∂Ψ푖∂휂
= ∂퐹∂Ψ푖
휒
휂 and ⟨푑Ψ퐴1 , 푑휂⟩ = −휂 [(휎1푖 + 휎1푧훼¯퐴1) Ψ푖 + (휎1푗 + 휎1푧훼¯퐴2)Ψ푗 + 휎1푧훽Ψ푧]
⇒ 휅푎푑푗1(1,:) = −휒
(
(휎1푖 + 휎1푧훼¯퐴1) , (휎1푗 + 휎1푧훼¯퐴2) , 휎1푧훽
)
1×3
∂2퐹
∂Ψ푗∂휂
= ∂퐹∂Ψ푗
휒
휂 and ⟨푑Ψ퐴2 , 푑휂⟩ = −휂 [(휎2퐴1 + 휎2푧훼¯퐴1)Ψ푖 + (휎2퐴2 + 휎2푧훼¯퐴2)Ψ푗 + 휎2푧훽Ψ푧]
⇒ 휅푎푑푗1(2,:) = −휒
(
(휎2퐴1 + 휎2푧훼¯퐴1) , (휎2퐴2 + 휎2푧훼¯퐴2) , 휎2푧훽
)
1×3
∂2퐹
∂Ψ푧∂휂
= ∂퐹∂Ψ푧
휒
휂 and ⟨푑Ψ푧, 푑휂⟩ = −휂 [(휎4퐴1 + 휎4푧훼¯퐴1)Ψ푖 + (휎4퐴2 + 휎4푧훼¯퐴2)Ψ푗 + 휎4푧훽Ψ푧]
⇒ 휅푎푑푗1(3,:) = −휒
(
(휎4퐴1 + 휎4푧훼¯퐴1) , (휎4퐴2 + 휎4푧훼¯퐴2) , 휎4푧훽
)
1×3
Thus,
휅푎푑푗1 = −휒
⎡⎣ (휎1푖 + 휎1푧훼¯퐴1) (휎1퐴2 + 휎1푧훼¯퐴2) 휎1푧훽(휎2퐴1 + 휎2푧훼¯퐴1) (휎2퐴2 + 휎2푧훼¯퐴2) 휎2푧훽
(휎3퐴1 + 휎3푧훼¯퐴1) (휎3퐴2 + 휎3푧훼¯퐴2) 휎3푧훽
⎤⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
3×3
Summarizing, the adjusted mean reversion matrix in the dynamics of Ψ is given by:
휅¯1 = 휅1 + 휅
푎푑푗
1 .
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Adjustment 4:
∂2퐹
∂푚푖∂휂
, 푖 = {퐴1, 퐴2}
∂2퐹
∂푚퐴2∂휂
=
휒퐴¯퐴1
휂 퐹 and ⟨푑푚퐴2 , 푑휂⟩ = −휂 [(휎4푖 + 휎5푧훼¯퐴1)Ψ푖 + (휎5퐴2 + 휎5푧훼¯퐴2)Ψ푗 + (휎5푧훽)Ψ푧]
∂2퐹
∂푚퐴2∂휂
=
휒퐴¯퐴2
휂 퐹 and ⟨푑푚퐴2 , 푑휂⟩ = −휂 [(휎6퐴1 + 휎6푧훼¯퐴1)Ψ푖 + (휎6퐴2 + 휎6푧훼¯퐴2)Ψ푗 + (휎6푧훽)Ψ푧]
Since these equations do not involve any derivatives of the type ∂∂Ψ푖 , but do involve linear terms in Ψ푖, I realize that
they adjust the constant 퐵푐 in ODE.2:
퐵푎푑푗1푐 = −휒
⎛⎝ [퐴¯퐴1 (휎4푖 + 휎5푧훼¯퐴1) + 퐴¯퐴2 (휎6퐴1 + 휎6푧훼¯퐴1)][퐴¯퐴1 (휎5퐴2 + 휎5푧훼¯퐴2) + 퐴¯퐴2 (휎6퐴2 + 휎6푧훼¯퐴2)][
퐴¯퐴1 (휎5푧훽) + 퐴¯퐴2 (휎6푧훽)
]
⎞⎠
Adjustment 5: The same logic applies to the derivatives of the form: ∂
2퐹
∂휂∂퐼 , 퐼 = {퐴1, 퐴2}
∂2퐹
∂휂∂퐴1
=
휒휀퐴1
휂퐴1
퐹 and ⟨푑휂, 푑퐴1⟩ = −휂퐴1휎9퐴1Ψ푖
∂2퐹
∂휂∂퐴2
=
휒휀퐴2
휂퐴2
퐹 and ⟨푑휂, 푑퐴2⟩ = −휂퐴2휎10퐴2Ψ푗
Thus the second adjustment to 퐵푐 is:
퐵푎푑푗2푐 = −휒
⎛⎝ 휀퐴1휎9퐴1휀퐴2휎10퐴2
0
⎞⎠
Summarizing, the constant vector in ODE.2 is given by:
퐵푐 = 퐵
푎푑푗1
푐 +퐵
푎푑푗2
푐
Adjustment 6:
1
2
∂2퐹
∂휂2 =
1
2
휒(휒−1)퐹
휂2
⟨푑휂, 푑휂⟩ = 휂2
(
휎ˆ28퐴1 + 휎ˆ
2
8퐴2
+ 휎ˆ28푧
)
= 푇푟
⎡⎣⎛⎝ (1 + 훼¯2퐴1) 훼¯퐴1훼¯퐴2 훼¯퐴1훽훼¯퐴1 훼¯퐴2 (1 + 훼¯2퐴2) 훼¯퐴2훽
훼¯퐴1훽 훼¯퐴2훽 훽
2
⎞⎠ΨΨ′
⎤⎦
Thus, the adjustment of the constant matrix in ODE.3 is given by:
퐶푐 =
1
2
휒(휒− 1)
⎛⎝ (1 + 훼¯2퐴1) 훼¯퐴1훼¯퐴2 훼¯퐴1훽훼¯퐴1훼¯퐴2 (1 + 훼¯2퐴2) 훼¯퐴2훽
푏푎푟훼퐴1훽 훼¯퐴2훽 훽
2
⎞⎠
I can now obtain the coeﬃcients 퐴(휏), 퐵(휏), 퐶(휏) by solving the system:
∂퐴
∂휏
= 퐵(휏)′휅¯0 + 푇푟 [퐶(휏)ΣΣ
′] +
1
2
퐵′(휏)ΣΣ′퐵(휏) +퐴푐 (ODE.1) (20)
∂퐵
∂휏
′
= 퐵(휏)′휅¯1 + 2휅¯
′
0퐶(휏) + 2퐵
′(휏)ΣΣ′퐶(휏) +퐵′푐 (ODE.2) (21)
∂퐶
∂휏
= 퐶(휏)휅¯1 + 휅¯
′
1퐶(휏) + 2퐶(휏)ΣΣ
′퐶(휏) + 퐶푐 (ODE.3),
where 퐴(0) = 0, 퐵(0) = 0, 퐶(0) = 0.
Last equation (ODE.3) can be solved in closed form by matrix Riccati linearization:
퐶(휏) = 퐹22(휏)
−1퐹21(휏),
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where (
퐹11(휏) 퐹12(휏)
퐹21(휏) 퐹22(휏)
)
= exp
[
휏
(
휅¯1 −2ΣΣ
′
퐶푐 −휅¯1
)]
.
Given 퐶(휏), I can obtain the solution for ODE.2 in closed form. First, for tractability, I re-write ODE.2 as:
∂퐵
∂휏
= 휅˜1퐵(휏) + 휅˜0,
where
휅˜1 = 휅¯1 + 2퐶(휏)ΣΣ
′
휅˜0 = 2퐶(휏)휅¯0 +퐵푐.
The solution for 퐵(휏) is follows as (see e.g. Laub, 2005):
퐵(휏) =
∫ 휏
0
푒휅˜1(휏−푠)휅˜0푑푠.
This matrix integral admits an explicit solution (see Thm.1 in van Loan, 1978). Deﬁning the following auxiliary
matrix
퐶푎푢푥 =
(
휅˜1 휅˜0
03×1 01×1
)
,
퐵(휏) is represented as the upper right subblock of the following matrix exponential
exp (휏퐶푎푢푥) =
(
퐹1(휏) 퐵(휏)
0 퐹2(휏)
)
.
This is the correct solution if 휅˜0, 휅˜1 are not time dependent. However, alternatively, the system can be solved
numerically (and eﬃciently) using, e.g., the Runge-Kutta method.
I can proceed in an analogous way to obtain the coeﬃcients in
퐹푚 = 푒
퐶¯(휏)+퐴¯퐴1(휏)푚퐴2+퐴¯퐴2 (휏)푚퐴2 = 푒퐶¯(휏)+퐴¯(휏)
′푚
where 푚 = (푚퐴2 ,푚퐴2)
′
. Let 퐽 = (퐴1, 퐴2)
′
, 푊¯ = (푊퐴1 ,푊퐴2) .
푑푚 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
푎0푖
푎0푗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
푙0
+
(
푎1푖 0
0 푎1푗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
푙1
푚
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ 푑푡+
(
휎4푖 휎5푗
휎6푖 휎6푗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
퐿
푑푊¯
푑퐽 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
0
0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
휆0
+
(
퐴1 0
0 퐴2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
휆1
퐽
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ 푑푡+
(
퐴1휎9퐴1 0
0 퐴2휎10퐴2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ
푑푊¯
Our goal is to reduce the problem of solving PDE in 퐹푋 , to solving just the PDE in 퐹푚, which can be done virtually
in closed form:
∂퐹푚
∂푡
+
∂퐹푚
∂푚′
(푙0 + 푙1푚)︸ ︷︷ ︸
휇푚
+
1
2
푇푟
[
∂2퐹푚
∂푚∂푚′
퐿퐿′
]
= 0.
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Which can be solved in two ODEs:
∂퐴¯
∂휏
′
푚 = 퐴¯(휏)′ 푙¯1푚+ 퐴¯푐푚 (ODE.1.1)
∂퐶¯
∂휏
= 퐴¯(휏)′ 푙¯0 +
1
2
퐴¯(휏)퐿퐿′퐴¯(휏) + 퐶¯푐 (ODE.1.2)
To this end, I apply the following adjustments:
1. Terms involving derivatives of the type ∂∂퐽 , 퐽 = {퐴1, 퐴2} adjust the constant vector in ODE.1.1.
2. Terms involving derivatives of the type ∂
2
∂푚푖∂퐼
, 푖 = {퐴1, 퐴2}, 퐼 = {퐴1, 퐴2} adjust the vector 푙0 in the drift of
푚.
3. Terms involving derivatives of the type ∂
2
∂퐽푖∂퐽푗
, 퐽 = {퐴1, 퐴2} adjust the constant in ODE.1.2.
Adjustment 1:
∂퐹
∂퐽 , 퐽 = {퐴1, 퐴2}
∂퐹
∂퐴1
=
휀퐴1
퐴1
퐹 and 휇퐴1 = 퐴1푚퐴2
∂퐹
∂퐴2
=
휀퐴2
퐴2
퐹 and 휇퐴2 = 퐴2푚퐴2
Adjustment 1 adds the following vector to the constant 퐴¯푐 in ODE.1.1:
퐴¯푎푑푗1푐 =
(
휀퐴1
휀퐴2
)
.
퐴¯푐 = 퐴¯
푎푑푗1
푐 .
Adjustment 2: ∂
2퐹
∂푚푖∂퐽푗
∂2퐹
∂푚퐴2∂퐴1
= ∂퐹∂푚퐴2
휀퐴1
퐴1
= 퐴¯퐴1
휀퐴1
퐴1
퐹 and ⟨푑푚퐴2 , 푑퐴1⟩ = 퐴1휎9퐴1휎4푖
∂2퐹
∂푚퐴2∂퐴2
= ∂퐹∂푚퐴2
휀퐴2
퐴2
= 퐴¯퐴1
휀퐴2
퐴2
퐹 and ⟨푑푚퐴2 , 푑퐴2⟩ = 퐴1휎10퐴2휎4푖
... ...
Adjustment 2 adds the following vector to 푙0
푙푎푑푗10 =
⎛⎝ 휀퐴1휎9퐴1휎4푖 + 휀퐴2휎10퐴2휎5퐴2휀퐴1휎9퐴1휎6퐴1 + 휀퐴2휎10퐴2휎6퐴2
휀퐴1휎9퐴1휎7퐴1 + 휀퐴2휎10퐴2휎7퐴2
⎞⎠
=
(
훾퐴푖 휀퐴1 + 훾
퐴
푖푗휀퐴2
훾퐴푖푗휀퐴1 + 훾
1
퐴2
휀퐴2
)
푙¯0 = 푙0 + 푙
푎푑푗1
0 .
Adjustment 3
∂2퐹
∂퐽푖∂퐽푗
, 퐽 = {퐴1, 퐴2}, i.e.
1
2
∑
푖푗
∂2퐹
∂퐽푖∂퐽푗
퐶푖푗 =
1
2푇푟
(
∂2퐹
∂퐽∂퐽′ΛΛ
′
)
∂2퐹
∂퐴2
1
=
휀퐴1 (휀퐴1−1)
퐴2
1
and ⟨푑퐴1⟩ = 퐴
2
1휎
2
9퐴1
∂2퐹
∂퐴1∂퐴2
=
휀퐴1휀퐴2
퐴1퐴2
and ⟨푑퐴1, 푑퐴2⟩ = 0
... ...
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퐶¯푐 =
1
2
푇푟
[(
휀퐴1(휀퐴1 − 1) 휀퐴1휀퐴2
휀퐴1휀퐴2 휀퐴2(휀퐴2 − 1)
)(
휎29퐴1 0
0 휎210퐴2
)]
=
1
2
[
휀퐴1(휀퐴1 − 1)휎
2
9퐴1 + 휀퐴2(휀퐴2 − 1)휎
2
10퐴2
]
The system of ODEs (1.1–1.2) can now be solved explicitly:
∂퐴¯
∂휏
′
= 퐴¯(휏)′ 푙¯1 + 퐴¯푐 (ODE.1.1)
∂퐶¯
∂휏
= 퐴¯(휏)′ 푙¯0 +
1
2
퐴¯(휏)퐿퐿′퐴¯(휏) + 퐶¯푐 (ODE.1.2)
It is easy to see that since 푙1 is a diagonal matrix, the equations in ODE.1.1 are uncoupled, i.e. can be solved
explicitly element-by-element.
∂퐴¯푖
∂휏
= 퐴¯푖(휏)푙1,푖푖 + 퐴¯푐,푖, 퐴¯푖(0) = 0
퐴¯푖(휏) = −
퐴¯푐,푖
푙1,푖푖
(
1− 푒푙1,푖푖휏
)
.
Given this solution ODE.1.2. is obtained by direct integration.
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B Data Appendix
The data runs from January 1996 to September 2008 (153 observations). I use a monthly frequency
throughout the paper.
B.1 Options Data
Options data is from OptionMetrics, LLC. I apply a series of ﬁlters
1. I eliminate prices that violate arbitrage bounds, i.e. call prices are required not to fall outside
the interval
(
푆푒−푟푑 −퐾푒−휏푟, 푆푒−휏푑
)
, where 푆 is the spot price, 퐾 is the strike price, 푑 is the
dividend yield, 푟 is the risk-free rate, and 휏 is the time to maturity.
2. I eliminate all observations for which (i) the ask is lower than the bid price, (ii) the bid is
equal to zero, or (iii) the spread is lower than the minimum tick size (equal to USD 0.05 for
options trading below USD 3 and USD 0.10 in any other cases).
3. To mitigate the impact of stale quotes I eliminate from the sample all observations for which
both the bid and the ask are equal to the one on the previous day.
4. I focus on short-term options which are known to be the most liquid with a time to maturity
between 14 and 31 days.
Moneyness of a call (put) option is deﬁned as the ratio of strike price to stock price (stock price to
strike price).17
B.2 Stock Data
Monthly stock data is from CRSP.
B.3 Corporate Bond Data
Bond data is from the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) on corporate bond characteristics
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) database on bond transactions.
Corporate bond spreads are calculated using the corresponding zero-coupon yield available from
CRSP.
B.4 Firm-Speciﬁc Information
Leverage is deﬁned as book value of debt (Compustat item 9 and 34) divided by total asset value
(Compustat item 6). The stock’s market beta is calculated from a regression of the stocks excess
return on the market excess return using historical returns over a 180 day window18. Firm size is
deﬁned as the natural log of the ﬁrm’s market value of equity, in thousands of dollars. Data is from
Compustat.
17There are several alternative ways to measure moneyness. For instance, Bollen and Whaley (2004) use the Black
and Scholes delta to measure moneyness, Ni (2007) and Carr and Wu (2009) use the total volatility adjusted strike
to stock price ratio.
18The choice of a relatively short window size is in line with Lewellen and Nagel (2006).
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B.5 Macroeconomic Variables:
Monthly data on real nondurable and services consumption is from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Expenditures are in 2000 dollars. Monthly consumption growth is deﬁned as the log-
diﬀerenced real consumption per capita. Following Granger and Newbold (1986), I construct a
smoothed consumption series by using an exponential moving average. Consumption volatility is
constructed by estimating a GARCH(1,1) on the consumption growth series. I retrieve S&P 500
price-earnings data from the S&P webpage, and the other macro variables we get from FRED.
B.6 Disagreement Measures
Firm Speciﬁc Disagreement:
To construct a proxy of disagreement about future cash ﬂows, I collect analysts’ earning forecasts
from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. In particular, I use the un-
adjusted Forecast Detail database which provides forecast data unadjusted for stock splits. I then
calculate for each ﬁrm, for each month, the mean absolute diﬀerence of all forecasts made.
Common Disagreement:
When the number of belief disagreement processes, 푁 is very large, an estimation of the common
factor via the Likelihood function is computational infeasible (see Ludvigson and Ng, 2007). This
high dimensionality has motivated the work on alternative methods to estimate dynamic factor
models. Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) and Connor and Korajczyk (1986) show that if 푛 goes
to inﬁnity, the factors are estimated consistently using principal components, see Brillinger’s (2001)
dynamic principal components. The theory of applying this theory, based on frequency domain
methods is developed by Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin (2000). In the following, we brieﬂy
summarize the estimation procedure, for technical details and a more rigorous presentation the
reader is referred to Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin (2000).
The estimation procedure is derived in two steps. The ﬁrst step consists of estimating the spectral
density matrix and the covariances of the common components. We start by estimating the spectral
density matrix Σ(휔) of 퐷(푡) = (퐷1푡, 퐷2푡, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 퐷푁푡)
′
. The estimation of Σ(휔) is obtained by using
a Bartlett lag-window size of 푀 = 2. We use a heuristic rule, which sets the window size equal to
푟표푢푛푑(
√
푇/4), see Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin (2000). The estimation is done via the discrete
Fourier transform:
Σˆ퐷 (휔) =
1
2휋
푀∑
푘=−푀
푤푘Γˆ푘 exp(−푖휔푘),
where Γˆ푘 denotes the sample autocovariance matrices, and 푤푘 = 1− ∣푘∣/(푀 + 1) the weights.
We then perform the dynamic principal component decomposition (see Brillinger, 2001). For each
frequency of the grid, we compute the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of Σˆ(휔). By ordering the
eigenvalues in descending order for each frequency and collecting values correspondingly to diﬀerent
frequencies, the eigenvalues, 휆ˆ푗 and eigenvectors, 푈푗(휔), are obtained. The eigenvalue 휆ˆ푗 can be
interpreted as the spectral density of the 푗-the principal component. To determine the optimal
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number of common factors, we study the contribution of the 푗-th principal component to the total
variance:
푐푗 =
∫ 휋
−휋
휆ˆ푗(휔)푑휔/
푁∑
푗=1
∫ 휋
−휋
휆ˆ푗(휔)푑휔.
Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin (2000) show that there exist a linkage between the number of
common factors and the eigenvalues of the spectral density matrix. In practice, however, there does
not exist a formal testing procedure to distinguish between very slowly diverging eigenvalue and a
bounded one, therefore, we follow the heuristic procedure applied by Cristadoro, Forni, Reichlin,
and Veronese (2005), by imposing the criteria that the dynamic common factors should account for
a certain percentage of the total variability in the data across all frequencies, and the number of
dynamic common factors is set equal to the number of largest dynamic eigenvalues that together
capture this variance ratio. In our case, the number of common components is set to 푞 = 2. Let
Λ푞(휔) be a diagonal matrix, having as elements the eigenvalues, 휆1(휔), ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 휆푞(휔) and let 푈(휔) be
the [푛× 푞] matrix of the eigenvectors, 푈1(휔), ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 푈푞(휔). Then the estimate of the spectral density
matrix of the common components, 휍(푡) = (휍1푡 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 휍푁푡)
′
:
Σˆ휍(휔) = 푈(휔)Λ(휔)푈˜(휔),
where the tilde denotes a conjugate. The spectral density of the idiosyncratic component is obtained
as the diﬀerence of the spectral density matrices of the common component and the 퐷.
The second step consists of estimating the factor space. Given the estimated covariance matrices in
the ﬁrst step, we can now estimate the factors as a linear combination of the observable variables,
퐷푗푡, 푗 = 1, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 푁 . To this end, we take the ﬁrst 푟 generalized principal components of the estimated
spectral density matrix of the common components, Γˆ휍 with respect to the diagonal matrix having on
the diagonal the variances of the idiosyncratic components. Estimates of the common components
are derived by projecting the common components on the space spanned by the ﬁrst 푟 generalized
principal components. To this end, we compute the generalized eigenvalues, 휇푗, solving 푑푒푡(Γˆ퐷(0)−
푧Γˆ휍 = 0 along with the generalized eigenvectors, 푉푗, satisfying 푉푗Γˆ퐷(0) = 휇푗푉푗Γˆ휍(0). Then we
take the eigenvectors corresponding to the largest 푟 eigenvalues. The estimtaed factors are then
푉푗푡 = 푉
′
푗Ψ푗푡. To determine the number of static factors, 푟, we rely on Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and
Reichlin (2005), who propose to use 푟 = 푞(푘 + 1).19 Using the generalized principal components
and the covariances estimated previously, we can now estimate the common component Ψ¯푡. The
estimate of Ψ¯푡 is given by:
Ψ¯푡+ℎ = 푉ˆ퐷(ℎ)푉
(
푉 ′Γˆ(0)푉
)
−1
푉 ′Ψ푡.
19More formal information criterions include Bai and Ng (2001), Hallin and Liˇska (2007), and Alessi, Barigozzi,
and Capasso (2008).
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Figure 1. Volatility Risk Premium for Low and High Leverage Firms
The upper (lower) left panel plots the average volatility risk premium deﬁned as 퐸ℚ푡
(∫ 푡+1
푡 푑푟푖
)
− 퐸ℙ푡
(∫ 푡+1
푡 푑푟푖
)
of
all ﬁrms in the S&P500 in the 5th (95th) leverage percentile. The integrated variance under the risk-neutral measure
ℚ is proxied using the method in Carr and Madan (1998) and Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000). It is deﬁned as:
퐸ℚ푡
(∫ 푡+1
푡
푑푟2푖
)
= 2
∫ ∞
0
퐶 (푡, 푡+ 1,퐾)−max (푆(푡)−퐾, 0)
퐾2
푑퐾,
and the model-free implied volatility is deﬁned as the square root of this expression. The integrated realized volatility
under the physical measure, ℙ, is the square root of the sum of squared daily log continuously compounded returns
over the month. Both volatility measures are of monthly basis and are available at the end of each observation
month. Leverage is deﬁned as the ratio of the book value of debt and the total asset value. The average is market
capitalization weighted. The shaded areas represent ﬁnancial or economic crises deﬁned according to the NBER.
The right panel depicts the boxplots of the volatility risk premia summary of low (left) and high (right) leverage
ﬁrms. The upper, middle, and lower lines indicate the upper quartile, median, and lower quartile, respectively.
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Figure 2. Trading Strategies
This ﬁgure presents annual returns and Sharpe ratios for six diﬀerent option trading strategies. HFI refers to the
Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index. The variance swap strategies are so called Risk Equivalent Portfolios
(REPs). They usually contain one risk-free asset (LIBOR) and one short variance swap, where the amount of
variance sold is such that it meets a certain risk/return objective. LowVol stands for 5% volatility per annum,
MedVol for 10% volatility per annum, and HighVol for 15% volatility per annum. BXM stands for the CBOE S&P
500 BuyWrite Index. The data is monthly and runs from January 1996 to September 2007.
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Figure 3. Volatility Risk Premia for Diﬀerent Leverage Ratios
This Figure plots the volatility risk premia, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the expected integrated volatility under
the risk-neutral and physical distribution for three diﬀerent leverage ratios and two diﬀerent levels of macro-economic
uncertainty (휎휇퐴푖 ). Low (high) Ψ indicates that the disagreement is set to 0.5 (0.1), i.e. Ψ퐴1 = Ψ퐴2 = Ψ푧 = 0.5
(Ψ퐴1 = Ψ퐴2 = Ψ푧 = 0.1). Low and high growth rate volatility are set to 0.0029 and 0.0041, respectively. Low
leverage is ﬁxed at 0.05, medium at 0.1, and high leverage is ﬁxed at 0.14.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
This table reports the 5th percentile, median, and 95th percentiles of the model-free implied volatility, realized
volatility, and skewness across securities per year. The risk-neutral implied volatility is calculated as in Carr and
Madan (1998) and Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000). The realized volatility is calculated from stock returns and
ﬁnally, the risk-neutral skewness is calculated as in Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003) using data on out-of-the-
money calls and puts. The Firm Speciﬁc Disagreement is calculated from analysts’ earning forecasts, the Common
Disagreement is a dynamic factor estimated from the cross-section of ﬁrm-speciﬁc disagreement, Consumption Growth
Volatility is estimated from a two state Markov switching process on consumption growth data. Leverage is total
debt over total asset value, the Macro Factor is the ﬁrst principal component using industrial production, housing
start number, the producer price index, non-farm employment, and the S&P 500 P/E ratio, the Market Beta is the
slope coeﬃcient from a regression of the ﬁrm excess return on the market excess return, ﬁnally, Firm Size is the
market value of equity. AC(1) indicates the ﬁrst autocorrelation coeﬃcient. The time period is from January 1996
to September 2008.
Year Implied Volatility Realized Volatility Skewness
0.05 0.5 0.95 0.05 0.5 0.95 0.05 0.5 0.95
1996 10.938 25.098 45.923 9.292 23.988 44.110 -4.198 -0.583 1.193
1997 11.022 29.912 46.387 10.283 29.011 45.182 -3.138 -0.420 0.998
1998 12.928 28.726 46.373 13.288 28.928 46.927 -4.293 -0.625 0.872
1999 13.938 27.826 47.993 13.283 27.837 47.837 -4.382 -0.477 0.937
2000 15.119 25.883 48.837 16.012 26.282 48.928 -5.192 -0.638 0.682
2001 13.873 24.193 45.773 12.018 23.444 43.737 -5.018 -0.544 0.766
2002 12.728 23.877 44.298 11.327 21.336 42.311 -4.876 -0.651 0.972
2003 10.834 23.293 43.399 9.828 20.218 41.299 -4.119 -0.837 0.880
2004 11.639 23.847 42.982 10.002 20.292 40.192 -4.288 -0.921 1.018
2005 12.938 24.636 41.828 21.993 23.339 42.774 -3.930 -0.762 0.872
2006 13.938 24.474 43.938 13.382 23.933 43.998 -4.498 -0.482 1.013
2007 14.866 25.837 45.943 14.948 26.887 46.994 -4.872 -0.293 0.917
2008 18.928 28.912 47.198 19.287 27.182 46.248 -3.938 -0.318 1.198
Mean StDev AC(1) Corr Corr
VolRP Skewness
Volatility Risk Premium ×102 1.4644 1.3753 0.49 1.00 0.62
Risk-Neutral Skewness -0.2808 0.1880 0.54 0.62 1.00
Idiosyncratic Disagreement 0.2981 0.4192 0.45 0.46 0.37
Common Disagreement 0.0928 0.0384 0.65 0.44 0.21
Consumption Growth Volatility 0.4211 0.1192 0.87 0.35 0.41
Leverage 0.1024 0.1907 0.32 0.38 0.42
Macro Factor 0.0148 0.1814 0.96 0.34 0.47
Market Beta 1.0098 0.6239 0.67 0.19 0.08
Firm Size 17.9283 2.9388 0.20 -0.29 0.10
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Table 2
Choice of Parameter Values and Benchmark Values of State Variables
This table lists the parameter values used for all ﬁgures in the paper. We calibrate the model to the mean and
volatility of the dividends on the S&P 500. The average growth rate for the period 1996-2006 is 5.93% and the
volatility is 3.52%. The initial values for the conditional variances are set to their steady-state variances.
Parameters for Fundamentals
Long-term growth rate of cash ﬂow growth 푎0퐴푖 0.01
Mean-reversion parameter of cash ﬂow growth 푎1퐴푖 -0.01
Volatility of cash ﬂow 휎퐴푖 0.07
Volatility of cash ﬂow growth 휎휇퐴푖 0.0035
Initial level of cash ﬂow 퐴푖 1.00
Initial level of cash ﬂow growth 푚퐴퐴푖 0.01
Parameters for Signal
Long-term growth rate of signal 푎0푧 0.01
Mean-reversion parameter of signal 푎1푧 -0.03
Volatility of signal 휎푧 0.06
Agent specific Parameters
Relative risk aversion for both agents 훾 4.00
Time Preference Parameter 휌 0.02
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Table 3
Calibrated Moments
This table presents moments based on 250 simulations each with 153 months of observation. The parameters for used
are given in Table 2. No 휎휇퐴푖 indicates that the time-varying cash ﬂow growth volatility is shut down by setting it to
a constant value. No DiB means that all the disagreement processes are set equal to zero, i.e. Ψ퐴푖 = Ψ푧 = 0. 0.05,
0.5, and 0.95 represent the 5th, median, and 95th quantile, respectively. 휎ℙ (휎ℚ) indicates the expected volatility
under the physical (risk-neutral) measure.
Statistic Full Model No 휎휇퐴푖 No DiB
0.05 0.5 0.95 0.05 0.5 0.95 0.05 0.5 0.95
휎ℙ 2.14 10.27 17.93 2.64 8.72 10.30 2.38 8.12 9.62
휎ℚ 3.28 13.31 19.28 2.92 8.98 11.84 2.39 8.13 9.64
AC(1) — 휎ℙ 0.78 0.89 0.98 0.69 0.73 0.84 0.67 0.70 0.84
AC(1) — 휎ℚ 0.69 0.78 0.83 0.65 0.69 0.86 0.69 0.70 0.84
Mean 1.12 1.20 1.39 0.27 0.42 1.02 0.03 0.10 0.12
StDev 0.47 0.84 1.23 0.25 0.56 0.74 0.10 0.18 0.22
Skewness 0.48 1.29 3.92 0.22 0.87 2.01 0.01 0.45 1.01
Kurtosis 7.92 9.29 10.29 4.28 6.39 8.82 3.91 4.32 5.01
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Table 4
Simulated Volatility Risk Premia Regressions
This table presents estimated coeﬃcient of running the following panel regression:
푉 표푙푅푃푖(푡) = 훽0 + 훽1퐷퐼퐵푖,푡 + 훽2퐷퐼퐵푡 + 훽3휎휇푐 + 휖푖,푡,
where 푉 표푙푅푃푖(푡) is the volatility risk premium of ﬁrm 푖, 퐷퐼퐵푖,푡 is the proxy of belief disagreement of each individual
ﬁrm 푖 at time 푡, 퐷퐼퐵푡 the common disagreement which I proxy as the equally weighted average from the individual
퐷퐼퐵푖,푡, and 휎휇푐 , the consumption growth volatility, which is estimated from a two-state Markov switching process
on the equilibrium consumption. The volatility risk premium is calculated from simulated stock returns and option
prices over 1,000 simulations of 153 months length. The second and third column present the estimated coeﬃcient
for a low (high) leverage ﬁrm, respectively. A low (high) leverage ﬁrm is deﬁned to have a ﬁxed asset to debt ratio
of 0.05 (0.2). The 푅2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Volatility Risk Premium Low Leverage High Leverage
Constant 0.001 0.002 0.002
(3.98) (4.10) (5.92)
Firm-speciﬁc DiB 0.029 -0.038 0.037
(15.98) (-1.83) (17.93)
Common DiB 0.092 -0.084 0.044
(5.93) (-4.92) (6.09)
Consumption Growth Volatility 0.363 0.482 0.519
(7.93) (6.32) (8.88)
Adjusted 푅2 0.34 0.23 0.41
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Table 5
Simulated Stock Excess Returns and Credit Spreads: Predictability
This table presents estimated coeﬃcients from predictability regressions, using simulated data. The statistics are
based on 250 simulations each with the corresponding sample size as its data counterpart (153 months). The
parameters for calibrating the model are given in Table 2. Panel A reports estimated coeﬃcients of the following
regression:
퐸푥푅푒푡푖(푡+ ℎ) = 훼+ 훽1푉 표푙푅푃푖(푡) + 휖(푡+ ℎ),
where 퐸푥푅푒푡푖 is the return of stock 푖 in excess of the risk-free rate and 푉 표푙푅푃푖 is the volatility risk premium of
ﬁrm 푖, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the model-free implied volatility and realized volatility. Panel B reports
estimated coeﬃcients of the following regression:
퐶푆푖(푡+ ℎ) = 훼+ 훽1푉 표푙푅푃푖(푡) + 휖(푡+ ℎ),
where 퐶푆푖 is the credit spread of ﬁrm 푖 deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the corporate bond credit spread and the
zero-coupon yield. Robust t-Statistics following Newey and West (1987) are reported in brackets below the estimate
calculated with 24 lags. The 푅2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Stock Excess Returns Corporate Credit Spreads
Horizon 1 6 12 1 6 12
Constant 0.021 0.023 0.019 109.983 110.323 112.938
(3.94) (2.38) (2.09) (4.48) (5.69) (5.48)
VolRP 0.291★★★ 0.191★★★ 0.102★★★ 56.938★★ 67.987★★★ 72.394★★★
(5.93) (6.83) (7.10) (5.98) (6.00) (7.37)
Adjusted 푅2 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.22
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Table 6
Panel Regression Analysis: Volatility Risk Premia and Skewness
This table presents estimated coeﬃcients from the following panel regression:
푦푖(푡) = 훽0 + 훽1퐷퐼퐵푖,푡 + 훽2퐷퐼퐵푡 +
6∑
푗=3
훽푗Control(푗)푖,푡 +
3∑
푘=1
훾푘Control푡 + 휖푖,푡,
where 푦푖(푡) is the volatility risk premium and skewness of ﬁrm 푖, 퐷퐼퐵푖,푡 is the proxy of belief disagreement of
each individual ﬁrm 푖 at time 푡, 퐷퐼퐵푡 the common disagreement estimated from the cross-section of individual
disagreement proxies, Control푖,푡 are leverage, ﬁrm size, and market beta of each ﬁrm 푖 at time 푡, and Control푡 is the
macro factor. The data has monthly frequency and covers the period January 1996 to September 2008. The 푅2 is
adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Volatility Risk Premium Risk-Neutral Skewness
Constant 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.210 -0.339 -0.417
(5.29) (4.98) (5.38) (-2.13) (-2.02) (-1.99)
Firm-Speciﬁc DiB 0.041 0.042 0.045 0.014 0.013 0.014
(3.29) (2.98) (2.02) (4.95) (5.93) (2.93)
Common DiB 0.108 0.090 0.180 0.098 0.083 0.096
(2.22) (1.98) (2.73) (2.94) (2.84) (3.01)
Consumption Volatility 0.293 0.321 0.421 0.539 0.874 0.476
(3.02) (3.98) (2.49) (2.39) (1.98) (2.17)
Leverage 0.087 0.091 0.411 0.431
(2.03) (2.22) (4.02) (3.77)
Firm Size -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
(1.02) (1.08) (0.83) (0.54)
Market Beta -0.039 -0.031 -0.129 -0.102
(-1.45) (-1.21) (-1.10) (-0.97)
Macro Factor -0.219 -0.389
(-3.10) (-2.01)
Adjusted 푅2 0.12 0.13 0.20 0.10 0.13 0.24
Volatility Risk Premium Risk-Neutral Skewness
Low Medium High Low Medium High
Constant 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.398 -0.182
(3.18) (2.17) (-3.82) (2.19) (-2.48) (-3.01)
Firm-Speciﬁc DiB -0.055 0.009 0.039 -0.008 0.001 0.029
(-2.01) (1.67) (3.08) (-1.93) (2.99) (2.48)
Common DiB 0.022 0.019 0.029 0.003 0.006 0.007
(2.02) (1.64) (1.99) (3.94) (2.90) (2.74)
Consumption Volatility -1.294 1.329 1.702 -0.103 0.304 0.410
(-3.92) (4.02) (2.49) (-0.93) (1.78) (2.05)
Firm Size -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(-0.83) (0.56) (1.07) (-0.98) (0.56) (1.02)
Market Beta -0.021 -0.031 -0.042 -0.302 -0.102 -0.001
(-0.78) (-1.98) (-0.96) (-1.09) (-1.45) (-1.00)
Macro Factor -0.098 -0.293 -0.342 -0.412 -0.341 -0.356
(-1.49) (-2.02) (-3.77) (-2.01) (-2.93) (-2.09)
Adjusted 푅2 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20
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Table 7
Stock Excess Returns and Credit Spreads: Predictability
Panel A reports estimated coeﬃcients of the following regression:
퐸푥푅푒푡푖(푡+ ℎ) = 훼+ 훽1푉 표푙푅푃푖(푡) + 휖(푡+ ℎ),
where 퐸푥푅푒푡푖 is the return of stock 푖 in excess of the 1 month Libor and 푉 표푙푅푃푖 is the volatility risk premium of ﬁrm 푖, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
the model-free implied volatility and realized volatility. Panel B reports estimated coeﬃcients of the following regression:
퐶푆푖(푡+ ℎ) = 훼+ 훽1푉 표푙푅푃푖(푡) + 휖(푡+ ℎ),
where 퐶푆푖 is the credit spread of ﬁrm 푖 deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the corporate bond credit spread and the zero-coupon yield. Robust t-Statistics
following Newey and West (1987) are reported in parentheses below the estimate calculated with 24 lags. The data has monthly frequency and covers
the period January 1996 to December 2007. The 푅2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Panel A: Stock Excess Returns
Horizon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Constant 0.024 0.014 0.019 0.023 0.027 0.020 0.022 0.024 0.028 0.019 0.025 0.031
(1.23) (1.01) (1.03) (1.28) (0.98) (0.83) (0.91) (1.02) (1.29) (0.84) (0.97) (1.02)
VolRP 0.018 0.024 0.031 0.027 0.022 0.019 0.025 0.011 0.023 0.028 0.029 0.034
(2.01) (1.87) (1.98) (1.99) (2.14) (2.48) (2.53) (2.61) (2.02) (1.77) (1.85) (2.02)
Adjusted 푅2 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04
Panel B: Corporate Credit Spreads
Horizon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Constant 120.632 110.934 118.736 114.183 98.734 103.283 117.837 109.827 110.990 103.811 119.098 100.987
(5.24) (4.29) (3.94) (4.20) (2.99) (4.76) (5.07) (4.82) (3.91) (4.01) (4.92) (5.38)
VolRP 47.943 51.832 62.420 43.394 44.998 42.038 48.912 51.039 48.783 45.921 50.293 58.912
(2.48) (3.92) (4.10) (4.92) (5.01) (5.29) (4.09) (5.31) (2.02) (3.93) (3.03) (4.91)
Adjusted 푅2 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18
7
0
Table 8
Volatility Risk Premia: Cyclical versus Non-Cyclical Firms
This table presents estimated coeﬃcient of running the following panel regression once for cyclical ﬁrms and non-
cyclical ﬁrms:
푉 표푙푅푃푖(푡) = 훽0 + 훽1퐷퐼퐵푖,푡 + 훽2퐷퐼퐵푡 +
5∑
푗=3
훽푗Control(푗)푖,푡 +
3∑
푘=1
훾푘Control푡 + 휖푖,푡,
where 푉 표푙푅푃푖(푡) is the volatility risk premium of ﬁrm 푖, 퐷퐼퐵푖,푡 is the proxy of belief disagreement of each individual
ﬁrm 푖 at time 푡, 퐷퐼퐵푡 the common disagreement estimated from the cross-section of individual disagreement proxies,
Control푖,푡 are leverage, ﬁrm size, and market beta of each ﬁrm 푖 at time 푡, and Control푡 is the macro factor. Industry
classiﬁcations are based on Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1994), who sort industries by their correlation
between industry level output growth and aggregate output growth. I label the ﬁve industries with the highest
output growth beta as cyclical and the ﬁve industries with the lowest output growth beta as non-cyclical. The data
has monthly frequency and covers the period January 1996 to September 2008. The 푅2 is adjusted for degrees of
freedom.
Cyclical Non-Cyclical
Constant 0.001 0.001
(1.39) (1.48)
Firm-Speciﬁc DiB 0.045 0.020
(3.83) (2.01)
Common DiB 0.207 0.112
(1.84) (1.73)
Consumption Growth Volatility 2.867 1.028
(4.28) (1.64)
Firm Size -0.001 0.001
(1.37) (1.42)
Market Beta -0.023 -0.031
(-1.01) (-0.65)
Macro Factor -0.421 -0.227
(-4.11) (-3.24)
Adjusted 푅2 0.19 0.16
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Table 9
Stock Excess Returns and Credit Spreads: Predictability of Cyclical versus
Non-Cyclical Firms
Panel A reports estimated coeﬃcients for cyclical ﬁrms of the following regression:
푥푟푖(푡+ ℎ) = 훼+ 훽1푉 표푙푅푃푖(푡) + 휖(푡+ ℎ),
where 푥푟푖 is the excess return of stock 푖 or the credit spread of ﬁrm 푖 and ℎ and 푉 표푙푅푃푖 is the volatility risk premium
of ﬁrm 푖, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the model-free implied volatility and realized volatility. Panel B reports
estimated coeﬃcients for the non-cyclical ﬁrms. Industry classiﬁcations are based on Boudoukh, Richardson, and
Whitelaw (1994), who sort industries by their correlation between industry level output growth and aggregate output
growth. I label the ﬁve industries with the highest output growth beta as cyclical and the ﬁve industries with the
lowest output growth beta as non-cyclical. Robust t-Statistics following Newey and West (1987) are reported in
brackets below the estimate calculated with 24 lags. ★ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ★★ denotes signiﬁcance
at the 5% level and ★ ★ ★ denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level. The data has monthly frequency and covers the period
January 1996 to December 2007. The 푅2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Panel A: Cyclical Stocks
Stock Excess Returns Corporate Credit Spreads
Horizon 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
Constant 0.009 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.015 105.012 102.372 106.182 112.290 117.176
(1.03) (1.27) (1.37) (1.67) (1.37) (2.81) (2.38) (3.98) (4.22) (3.87)
VolRP 0.039 0.045 0.042 0.040 0.041 45.193 44.918 50.474 51.228 50.991
(2.38) (3.94) (4.29) (5.37) (5.92) (4.93) (4.09) (5.82) (5.29) (5.92)
Adjusted 푅2 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.20 0.21
Panel B: Non-Cyclical Stocks
Stock Excess Returns Corporate Credit Spreads
Horizon 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
Constant 0.010 0.012 0.019 0.017 0.019 108.932 109.282 110.838 119.726 113.321
(1.21) (1.45) (1.03) (1.27) (1.37) (2.83) (4.27) (5.38) (4.99) (3.83)
VolRP 0.022 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.022 40.913 39.932 43.938 39.712 40.110
(1.45) (1.73) (1.65) (1.67) (1.82) (3.28) (1.87) (2.09) (2.73) (2.44)
Adjusted 푅2 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.14
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